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An institutional investor is an organization that invests money on behalf of others or for itself 
in a variety of financial instruments and asset classes, controlling a significant proportion of all 
financial assets worldwide and having significant influence in all markets. Due to the large 
number of investments, the portfolios of these investors are exposed to a variety of different 
types of risk which must be assessed and considered by the portfolio managers. Krueger et al. 
(2020) highlight the fact that institutional investors have to consider at least six different sources 
of risk, namely financial, operational, governance, social, climate and other environmental 
risks. Their study shows that institutional investors consider financial risks, i.e. risks related to 
earnings or leverage of their investments, as most threatening, followed by operational and 
governance risks. These financial risks are determined, inter alia, by the composition of the 
portfolio and the characteristics of the assets under management. As shown by Benz et al. 
(2019) for mutual funds and Aragon and Martin (2012) for hedge funds, institutional investors 
not only invest in trivial assets such as equities and bonds, which expose the investor mainly to 
linear risks, but also in more complex securities such as options, swaps, and futures, exposing 
a portfolio to more complex sources of non-linear risk. 
After all, about 10% of all investors consider climate risk to be the most threatening 
one, which underlines the importance of this risk factor. The general climate risk includes, 
among others, the so-called carbon risk, which arises from the growing awareness of the impact 
of climate change on companies and includes all uncertainties arising from the transition 
process from a brown to a green economy (Görgen et al., 2020). In recent years, there have 
been a vast number of articles, both theoretical (e.g., Busch and Hoffmann (2011)) and 
empirical (e.g., Cunha et al. (2019)), which have shown that investors should consider this risk 
factor in their investment process.  
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In summary, the portfolios of institutional investors are constantly exposed to a variety 
of different types of risk. Therefore, one of the key tasks of portfolio managers is to be able to 
correctly assess and measure the risks taken and to act and react accordingly to portfolio 
changes or to external influences. This dissertation discusses several types of risk arising in the 
investment and portfolio allocation processes of institutional. 
In order to show that a specific type of institutional investor, namely US domestic equity 
funds, is exposed to a variety of risks through a wide range of financial securities, Article I 
provides a detailed identification and classification of all positions held by these funds. First, it 
is shown that the portfolios are exposed to financial risks through trivial linear positions such 
as equities, bonds, and cash positions. Furthermore, the exposure of the portfolios to non-linear 
risks through various complex instruments such as options and futures is highlighted. This 
precise breakdown of the funds' exposure to the financial securities held, makes it possible to 
break down all sources of risk accurately. This enables to determine the impact of a change in 
exposure to a particular financial asset and thereby control for the exact allocation of the 
portfolio. This procedure allows a precise analysis of the influence of different sources of risk, 
on different fund characteristic, in this case in the form of exposure to linear and non-linear 
financial securities. To identify the various financial instruments, monthly and quarterly 
holding reports are used in this study to examine the influence of linear or non-linear exposures 
on fund characteristics. 
However, these low frequency reports do not reflect the exact trading activity of a fund 
manager between reporting dates, which may lead to distorted conclusions about the fund’s 
portfolio held in between two consecutive reportings. Investors and research studies (e.g., 
Daniel et al. (1997)) determining the performance of their investments based on the reported 
holdings or selecting the respective investment based on certain holdings or the investments’ 
risk profile, are exposed to agency risk as they are unable to observe the exact intermediate 
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portfolio composition (Kacperczyk et al., 2008). The trading behavior of a fund manager in 
between two reportings, so-called interim trading, may change the risk structure of the fund 
compared to the risk structure that may be implied by the published holdings. In addition to an 
unobservable impact on a fund’s risk structure, these trading activities could have an impact on 
a fund’s performance. Article II therefore proposes an extension of the methodology used by 
Kacperczyk et al. (2008) to study the interim trading behavior of funds and shows its influence 
on the risk structure of the fund and various performance measures. 
In addition to financial risks resulting from the financial securities held, companies and 
their investors must also deal with other risks that are not of a financial nature, but which 
nevertheless jeopardize the portfolio in the long term. One of these risks results from the 
influence of climate change, whereby the industry will not be able to consume all remaining 
coal, oil and gas reserves to achieve the 2°C target set in Paris (Le Quéré et al., 2015). Therefore, 
assets lose their economic value long before their expected useful life, and the resulting carbon 
bubble might have a lasting impact on the valuation of carbon-intensive companies. As the 
negative impact of carbon emissions is becoming increasingly evident to society, these firms 
must be able to deal with possible changes in customer demand and the increased reputational 
risk associated with being classified as unsustainable or highly polluting (Cubas‐Díaz and 
Sedano, 2018). It is therefore also of great importance for the financiers of these companies. As 
shown by Cunha et al. (2019), institutional investors are becoming increasingly aware of the 
risks associated with climate change and are integrating social, government or environmental 
criteria into their investment decisions. Article III takes an in-depth look on this topic and shows 
which of the various groups of institutional investors is affected by carbon risk and to what 
extent. In addition to being portfolio managers, however, investors should also be seen as 
stakeholders with voting rights in the companies. Therefore, the ownership structure of carbon 
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intensive companies is examined to understand which investor group could have the greatest 
potential to engage in sustainable carbon management of the companies.  
In order to examine the engagement of shareholders more closely, i.e. the behavior of 
investors to use their position as shareholders to influence corporate decisions on 
environmental, social and governance issues, a new methodological approach is implemented 
in Article IV. To this end, the link between a firm's corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
performance and the eco-social preference of its investors, measured by the ESG values of the 
firms held by the investor, is examined in more detail. The objective is to show that companies 
financed by investors having portfolios with a high eco-social preference show an improved 
CSR performance, i.e. the investors exert influence to improve the company with regard to their 
own preference. When investigating the influence of investors on corporate decisions and 
processes, not only the preference of individual shareholders is important, but also the 
heterogeneity of investors with regard to this topic (Hoskisson et al., 2002). It can be assumed 
that investors with completely different preferences hinder a successful engagement process. 
To shed light on this matter, it is examined whether the heterogeneity of the investors regarding 
their eco-social preference has an influence on the CSR performance of the firm.  
Investors' shareholder engagement, as examined above, aims to engender new standards 
of corporate ESG practices in order to reduce firms’ carbon risk in the long term (Hoepner et 
al., 2018). Article V considers another sustainable trend in asset management, the 
decarbonization of institutional portfolios. In its traditional form, decarbonization describes the 
action to divest from carbon-intensive assets while investing in low-carbon assets instead and 
is mainly promoted by the Portfolio Decarbonization Coalition (PDC, 2015). The goal of the 
PDC is to “drive greenhouse gas emissions reductions by mobilizing a critical mass of 
institutional investors committed to gradually decarbonizing their portfolios” (PDC, 2015, p. 
1). In Article V, the mobilization of a critical mass is associated with the herding behavior of 
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institutional investors (following the method of Sias (2004)), i.e. the phenomenon of investors 
following the trading activities of other investors while ignoring their own information. This 
herding behavior of institutional investors is then associated with the idea of decarbonization. 
Therefore, it is important to examine whether institutional investors are more likely to follow 
the trades of other investors in the sense of decarbonization rather than trades in the sense of 
carbonization. This decarbonization herding is defined as investors following their own or other 
investors' purchases of green stocks or sales of brown stocks. In contrast, carbon herding is 
defined as investors behaving in exactly the opposite way, i.e. purchases of brown stocks and 
sales of green stocks are more followed. It also shows what type of investors are executing the 
trades that other investors are following, potentially triggering a critical mass of investors to 
decarbonize their portfolio. 
In the following, brief summaries of the individual articles are given. Chapters 2 to 6 
contain the individual articles and in chapter 7 the results and contributions of each article are 
summarized.  
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 Overview over papers included 
 Paper title Co-authors Published? Journal Date 
      
      
 Shedding light on the exposure of mutual 






Journal of Asset 




Trading in the Dark – What are Fund 
Managers doing when no one is watching? – No 
Working Paper, 
University of Augsburg 2021 
 
Investors’ Carbon Risk Exposure and their 






Business Strategy and 
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pp. 282-3012 
2021 
 Ownership comes with responsibility – 





No Working Paper, University of Augsburg 2021 
 
Herds on green meadows:  





Journal of Asset 




1.2.1 Article I: Shedding light on the exposure of mutual funds – Which investments 
drive mutual fund characteristics? 
Using an extensive holdings dataset for 2,707 US domestic equity funds, the first article 
examines the impact of different types of risk to which a fund is exposed via its investments. A 
detailed identification algorithm is used to identify 99.5% of all holding positions and classify 
them into 34 different types of investment instruments used by these funds. These include but 
are not limited to long and short equities, bonds, cash positions, and a wide range of complex 
investments exposing the fund to non-linear risk. This information enables the entire portfolio 
to be considered with its exact allocation. Thus, it is possible to examine the influence of a 
 
1 VHB-Jourqual 3: B, doi: 10.1057/s41260-019-00144-2. 
2 VHB-Jourqual 3: B, doi: 10.1002/bse.2621. This paper, previously known as “Investor Ownership and Carbon-
Intensive Stocks: Who Holds the Carbon Risk Bomb?”, was already included as a working paper in the dissertation 
of Janik Syryca. The working paper was subsequently completely revised, further developed and successfully 
published. 
3 VHB-Jourqual 3: B, doi: 10.1057/s41260-019-00147-z. 
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change in a particular type of investment on various fund characteristics and at the same time 
controlling for the remaining portfolio allocation.  
The article has focused on the influence of complex derivatives and, as it is shown, the 
use of these instruments is widespread among investment funds, with an average of over 40% 
of all funds using some form of derivatives. Nevertheless, the average aggregated exposure as 
a percentage of the funds' TNA obtained through all complex instruments is very low, at less 
than 2%, and relatively stable over time. For the individual non-linear financial securities, an 
average exposure ratio of less than 0.5% is shown, indicating that the funds are far less exposed 
to non-linear risks and their influence on various fund characteristics are less pronounced than 
previous studies suggest. 
1.2.2 Article II: Trading in the Dark – What are Fund Managers doing when no one is 
watching? 
The second article examines in more detail the unobservable trading behavior of fund managers 
between the low-frequency reporting dates. These reporting gaps make it difficult for investors 
and researchers to assess the precise intermediary activities of fund managers and to measure 
the performance of funds on the basis of their holdings. This imbalance of information creates 
risks such as agency costs between fund managers and their investors. However, by using the 
monthly or quarterly changes in reported holdings, it is possible to approximate the implicit 
trades executed by the fund manager. Based on this, it can then be determined what the interim 
trading behavior between two reports is like, whether it deviates from the expectations resulting 
from the reporting and whether there is a correlation between the intermediate trading behavior 
of the fund managers and the fund performance. For this purpose, a daily holding structure is 
estimated for each fund under the assumption that the fund manager would not have traded 
between two reports, with exceptions for trading activities that could have been implied from 
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two consecutive reported portfolio holdings. With these approximated daily values for each of 
the held positions, an approximated fund return is calculated, representing the fund return an 
investor would expect if the fund manager had traded as the portfolio changes imply. For the 
approximated return, monthly risk measures are then calculated and compared with risk 
measures for the actual daily fund return. Remaining differences between the two time series 
should be driven by interim trading activities which could not be expected from the published 
reports.  
Using a dataset of 835 US domestic equity funds, it is first shown that the fund managers 
execute trades that cannot be implied by the changes in their reportings, and that this behavior 
results on average in the actual risk exceeding the implied risk. It is also shown that the 
intermediate deviation from the expected risk structure has an impact on the risk-adjusted gross 
performance and gross return of the funds. In months in which the interim trading activity 
results in the actual fund risk deviating significantly from the anticipated risk, both positively 
and negatively, the funds show a higher risk-adjusted performance, but their interim trading 
activities harm their gross return.  
1.2.3 Article III: Investors’ Carbon Risk Exposure and their Potential for Shareholder 
Engagement 
Uncertainties about future regulations such as emission certificates or carbon taxes and a 
changing environmental awareness among consumers force companies and their investors to 
become aware of their exposure to so-called carbon risks. The goal of this article is to analyze 
the behavior of six different types of investors regarding their investments in carbon-intensive 
firms. Therefore, the share of carbon-intensive companies in their portfolios is examined in 
detail and it is shown that government agencies' portfolios in particular are heavily dominated 
by them, accounting on average for almost 49% of their portfolio value In their role as 
9 
shareholders, investors could use their voting rights to exert pressure on companies and, in 
relation to this study, to influence the firms’ carbon risk management. It is shown that 
governmental agencies with 27%, investment advisors with 18%, and hedge funds with 13 % 
hold the largest proportion of shares in carbon-intensive companies in their portfolios and could 
therefore have the greatest influence on these companies. A different picture emerges when the 
entire universe of carbon-intensive companies is considered, and not just the stocks included in 
investors' portfolios. It becomes clear that the most capital-intensive groups of investors, 
investment advisors and hedge funds finance the largest share of carbon-intensive companies. 
In terms of the market capitalization of all existing carbon-intensive companies, government 
agencies only hold a small share. This suggests that their high exposure to carbon risk is 
generated by individual selective high investments rather than by broadly distributed 
investments.  
1.2.4 Article IV: Ownership comes with responsibility – The impact of ownership 
characteristics on CSR 
In order to answer the question of whether and how the interests of owners have an influence 
on entrepreneurial decisions, previous studies have usually assumed that individual investor 
groups have a certain preference for key characteristics of companies. However, this approach 
presumes that the individual investors within this group are homogeneous and is therefore a 
flawed approach. This article proposes a new methodology which does not presume the 
preferences of the company owners but allows for a precise determination of this preference. 
Based on the equities held, the investor characteristics of each individual investor are first 
determined. These investor characteristics state, for example, that this investor holds shares 
with an average market capitalization of X$. Next, the investor characteristics of all company 
owners are used to determine a share-weighted ownership characteristic. This measure indicates 
that the owners have companies with certain characteristics in their portfolio, such as an average 
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market capitalization of X$, which is here interpreted as a preference for companies of this size. 
Therefore, the proposed methodology does not presume the preference of the owners but allows 
to determine it precisely.  
This research combines an extensive ownership database from the Refinitiv Ownership 
and Profiles database with ESG information on the owners’ shares held from Thomson Reuters' 
ASSET4 ESG database to examine the impact of shareholder engagement on corporate CSR 
performance. In this context, it is examined whether the preference of the owners for the ESG 
score of the shares they hold, as an indicator of their eco-social preferences, has an influence 
on the CSR performance of the company. The empirical study shows that companies are more 
likely to improve their CSR performance if their owners have a high portfolio-based ESG 
preference and the ownership structure is more homogeneous in terms of the owners' ESG 
preference, i.e. the owners' preferences are more similar. 
1.2.5 Article V: Herds on green meadows: the decarbonization of institutional portfolios 
In this article, one of the emerging trends in sustainable asset management, the decarbonization 
of investors’ portfolios, is analyzed and combined with the theory of investor herding. The idea 
of organizations such as the PDC is to mobilize a critical mass of investors to follow the 
decarbonization movement.  
In order to investigate whether this behavior can be observed on the financial market, 
this study uses a method similar to Sias (2004) to measure the herding behavior of institutional 
investors. It is first shown that these investors in general demonstrate herding behavior and to 
be more specific, follow the trades of other investors rather their own. Next, the herding 
measure is combined with a classification of stocks into green and brown and it is shown that 
there are more follow up trades on the purchase of green and sale of brown stocks compared to 
the sale of green and purchase of brown stocks. It is therefore shown, that decarbonization 
11 
herding exists and is of higher importance than carbonization herding. Furthermore, it is shown 
that hedge funds and investment advisors make up the largest part of herding and engage highly 
in decarbonization herding. Therefore, to mobilize a critical mass of investors to follow the 
decarbonization movement as proposed by the PDC, these types of investors are the ones who 
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Abstract. This paper is the first to identify and classify nearly all investment instruments held 
by equity funds by investigating their portfolio holdings. This enables us to analyze the effects 
of long and short exposures from different complex instruments including short sales, options 
and futures but also previously neglected derivatives like warrants and units on funds’ risk, 
performance and other characteristics. These analyses are of general interest, especially in the 
light of ongoing discussions regarding further regulation of complex instrument use by mutual 
funds. Our empirical analyses document that on average more than 40% of funds use complex 
instruments. However, relative to their total assets, funds’ average exposure from such positions 
is very small with values below 2%. Consequentially, the effects of instruments are often 
weaker than suggested by previous research or even show opposite directions.  
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3 Article II: Trading in the Dark – What are Fund Managers doing when no one is 
watching? 
 
Benz, Lukasa  
Working Paper (2021); University of Augsburg 
 
Abstract. When assessing the performance of equity mutual funds, performance measures are 
often calculated on the basis of holding information which are reported on a low-frequency 
basis. Thus, they do not reflect the exact trading activity of the fund managers in between the 
reporting dates, which can lead to biased conclusions on the managers' skill. In this study a new 
model is proposed to measure the influence of the fund managers' interim trading activity by 
comparing the actual realized risk with an approximated risk measure calculated from 
consecutive reported holding information. It is shown that the actions of the fund managers 
between two reports lead on average to a higher level of risk than the holdings suggest. Looking 
at the trading behavior of the fund managers in the individual months, it can be shown that the 
risk-adjusted performance increases if the fund managers increase or decrease their overall risk 
through their interim actions. In contrast, fund managers harm the gross return if they 
excessively alter the overall risk between two reportings compared to the risk implied by the 
holdings. 
 
JEL Classification: G11, G12, G29 
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 Introduction  
Managers of active mutual funds are usually considered to be informed and qualified, yet 
studies on their performance have shown mixed results. While some studies, such as Carhart 
(1997) and Wermers (2000), show that mutual fund managers underperform passive 
benchmarks after expenses, other studies (e.g., Kacperczyk et al. (2005) or Cremers and 
Petajisto (2009)) show that certain funds are indeed able to outperform benchmarks and thus 
demonstrate skill. In examining the capabilities of investment fund managers, some studies use 
trade-based performance measures to determine whether individual fund trades have been 
profitable (e.g., Chen et al. (2000), Alexander et al. (2007) or Rohleder et al. (2018)) or whether 
institutional trading activities predict future stock returns (e.g., Frazzini and Lamont (2008) or 
Wermers et al. (2012)).  
All of these studies have in common that they do not use actual trading data, but changes 
from consecutive quarterly or semi-annually disclosed holding reports to proxy for trades 
executed between these reports. Due to the low frequency of available information it is not 
possible to examine the exact trading activities of the managers between the reports, but one 
can solely evaluate the final outcome, the reported holdings. Consequently, despite the more 
and more extensive disclosure requirements (Agarwal et al., 2015), the results of these studies 
may be biased. By examining only quarterly or semi-annually changes in portfolio composition, 
several problems arise. Some funds may alter or distort their portfolios to mislead both 
researchers and investors as to their true skill by disclosing stock holdings at the wrong levels 
and therefore disproportionately disclosing higher (lower) percentages of winner (loser) stocks 
over the quarter. This practice known as window dressing is associated with less skilled 
managers who perform poorly compared to non-window dressing managers as shown by 
Agarwal et al. (2014). As these studies consider actively managed funds, it is in the nature of 
things for managers to trade between two reporting dates. An important part of their job is to 
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identify undervalued stocks and invest their clients' money profitably. During periods of 
positive inflows, fund managers need to increase or open new positions, and during periods of 
withdrawal, they need to liquidate positions to pay off investors. These trading activities 
between two reportings, the so-called interim trading, can be divided into two parts. The initial 
part can be anticipated by the holding changes of two successive reportings. The second part of 
interim trading occurs without investors or other outsiders being aware of it and cannot be 
anticipated by holding changes. Both of these trading activities can be beneficial to the investor 
if the fund manager uses information advantages to trade profitably within two reporting 
periods. However, increased trading activity can also be disadvantageous for investors due to 
the costs involved. Increased transaction and agency costs as well as negative effects on the risk 
strategy preferred by the investor can be caused by the intermediate trading activity of the fund 
manager. When measuring the performance of investment funds, it is therefore important to 
take appropriate account of the interim trading activities of fund managers. 
Existing studies have examined the actions of funds between their reports in different 
ways. Puckett and Yan (2011) examine the interim trading skill of institutional investors using 
actual intra-quarter trade data provided by ANcerno Ltd and calculate the interim trading 
performance of each fund as the difference between the performance of all shares that the fund 
buys and those it sells from the execution date up to the end of the respective quarter. 
Furthermore, they show that the trading performance of institutional investors is significantly 
positive, and they further argue that this relation is not evident if the performance of these 
investors is calculated on the basis of quarterly holding reports. Therefore, this illustrates the 
importance of an adequate consideration of the interim trading activity of managers.  
A different approach to measure interim trading was proposed by Farrell (2018). Having 
only quarterly equity holdings of mutual funds, the author uses a genetic algorithm to model a 
daily holding structure, resulting in a daily return series for each fund that most closely matches 
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the actual daily fund return. The modelled daily holdings and trades calculated from these 
holdings are used to measure whether the funds tend to demand or supply liquidity. It is shown 
that the funds tend to provide liquidity and that this liquidity provision is consistent over time 
and can therefore be used to predict future returns. 
The approach most similar to mine was developed by Kacperczyk et al. (2008). They 
estimate the impact of unobserved trading in between two reportings as the return gap resulting 
from the difference of the actual daily fund return and the return of a portfolio investing in the 
previously disclosed fund holdings. Interim trading actions of some funds are profitable, while 
these hidden trades destroy value for other funds according to their study. They conclude that 
the interim trading of funds is a sign of skill and can be an indicator of future performance.  
To measure interim trading, I follow the idea of Kacperczyk et al. (2008) and extend 
their model to measure interim trading in a more precise way. As already mentioned, some of 
the fund manager's trading actions between two reports can be anticipated when considering 
the disclosed holdings in two consecutive months. An increase (decrease) in the value held in 
a particular position from one month to the next can be achieved either by the daily return on 
the position in question or by an additional purchase (sale) by the fund manager in between 
reports. Given this, an approximation model is proposed that estimates the daily holding 
structure of each position reflecting the trading behavior that would have been anticipated by 
the reported holdings. In order to further extend the method, I do not compare return time series 
with each other (as in Kacperczyk et al. (2008)), but rather the difference in certain risk 
measures based on the actual and the approximated return time series respectively. One 
advantage of this approach is that not only the extent of interim trading of funds can be 
examined, but also whether this trading behavior leads to an increase or decrease of the portfolio 
risk above (below) the risk anticipated from the reported holdings. Therefore, the approximated 
measures reflect the risk resulting from the trading behavior of the funds, which can be derived 
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from the reported holdings and the actual measure reflects the risk resulting from the actual 
daily trading activity of the respective fund. The remaining differences between these measures 
are due to unexpected trading between the reportings. Therefore, in this study interim trading 
is defined as deviation from the anticipated holding structure rather than the last known holding 
structure, which is a more accurate way to measure unobserved trading. 
My results show that the actual risk taken by the funds differs from the risk that can be 
anticipated from the holdings and I conclude that funds actively trade between reports, i.e. they 
engage in interim trading. Using three different risk measures, the funds’ overall, systematic, 
and idiosyncratic risk, it is shown that the funds increase their risk through these trading 
activities on average by 2.6%, 0.65% and 4.91% respectively compared to the risk anticipated 
from their holdings.  
However, in order to examine the influence of these trading activities on the 
performance of the funds more closely, a distinction is made between months in which the fund 
intermediately increases its risk and months in which it reduces its risk compared to the risk of 
the approximated fund portfolio. As shown, the relationship varies depending on the risk and 
performance measures used. Funds exhibit a higher significant risk-adjusted gross performance 
in months in which their overall risk differs substantially from their approximate overall risk, 
compared with months in which the fund manager tends to act more in line with the anticipated 
change in reported holdings, i.e. actual risk is closer to implicit risk. If the overall risk is 
decomposed into systematic and idiosyncratic risk, a contrary pattern emerges. In months in 
which the funds take a higher (lower) systematic risk than expected, they show a significant 
lower (higher) performance, whereas an intermediate increase in idiosyncratic risk above 
(below) the expected level results in a significantly higher (lower) performance.  
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A different relation arises between the interim trading and the funds’ gross return. An 
excessive deviation of the overall risk compared to the risk of the approximated portfolio is 
accompanied by a decrease in the gross return compared to months in which the managers trade 
as expected by the holding changes. This relation is almost entirely driven by the intermediate 
deviation of the idiosyncratic risk compared to the risk expected by the holding changes. 
However, a deviation from the expected systematic risk does not lead to differences in gross 
returns. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data sources 
and provides first summary statistics. Section 3.3 motivates the proposed method of 
approximation of the daily fund holding structure, provides tests of goodness of the 
approximation and introduces the used performance and risk measures. Section 3.4 introduces 
the interim trading measure and investigates the general impact of interim trading as well as its 
impact on the funds’ performance and return. Section 3.5 concludes the study. 
 Data and summary statistic 
To answer my research question, I obtain data on mutual funds from different sources. From 
the Center for Research in Security Prices Mutual Fund Database I gather monthly share class 
level information such as returns, total net assets (TNA) as well as further characteristics like 
turnover and fees. Furthermore, I use the Morningstar Mutual Fund Database and obtain share 
class level daily return indices as well as information about the daily TNA. Both databases are 
free of survivorship bias and I follow Pastor et al. (2015) and Berk and van Binsbergen (2015), 
match these databases on share class level using CUSIPs and aggregate all share class level data 
on portfolio level using TNA-weights and the Morningstar share class portfolio map.  
In this study I focus on US domestic equity funds and conduct several screening 
mechanisms to ensure high data quality. Funds with less than 80% of exposure in equity over 
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time as well as all funds with less than 24 monthly returns during the sample period are not 
considered in this study. Furthermore, I follow Fama and French (2010) and exclude all funds 
before they first surpass a threshold of $5 million TNA to ease incubation bias (Evans, 2010). 
The preliminary dataset contains 2,802 US domestic equity funds, which are presented in Table 
1 Panel A, for which I was able to obtain all the data mentioned above from 1997 to 2015. Since 
I later exclude all funds that invest in any way in any kind of derivatives or derivative-like 
instruments, that leaves remain 835 US domestic equity funds reported in Panel B. These non-
derivative using funds are slightly smaller than the average of the overall sample, which was 
also shown by Natter et al. (2016), but the remaining fund characteristics are about the same 
compared to the overall sample. 
[Insert Table 1 here.] 
In order to investigate the trading behavior of the managers later on, information about 
the holding structure of the individual funds is obtained from the Morningstar Holding database. 
This database reports - usually monthly or quarterly - a variety of information on each position 
in the funds’ portfolios, e.g., the name, number of shares, type of holding, various identifiers 
(such as ISIN) and, most importantly, market value. This distinguishes the used MSTAR 
holdings from most other databases that only report common stock holdings.  
In addition, daily stock returns for all the stocks held in the portfolios of the funds as 
well as daily returns for different indices such as the S&P500, the MSCI World ex US and 
different bond indices1 are obtained from Thomson Reuters.  
 Methodology, Performance and Risk measures 
The objective of the proposed method is to approximate a daily holding pattern for each fund 
representing the trading behavior, which can be implied from two consecutive reports of the 
 
1 Corporate, government and municipal bond indices from Barclays are used in this study. 
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funds. Based on these approximated daily holdings, a value-weighted fund return series is 
calculated, and by later comparing this approximated daily fund return with the actual fund 
return, the influences of interim trading can be examined. 
3.3.1 Approximation of daily fund return series 
As mentioned before, the monthly/quarterly reports of a fund do not fully shed light on the 
exact transactions a fund executes between these dates. For each fund, a daily holding structure 
is estimated under the assumption that the fund manager would not have traded between two 
reports, with exceptions for trading activities that could have been expected from the respective 
reported portfolio holdings. 
The daily holding structure of each security held is approximated by comparing the 
reported held values in two consecutive reportings to determine which securities have been 
increased or decreased during the reporting period. Imagine the following example in which a 
fund holds a $100 stock position in December which shows a value of $150 end of January. 
The $50 increase in the stock position can be achieved either by the daily return of the stock or 
by an additional stock purchase by the fund manager between reportings. 
The relationship between the held values of a position from one reporting to the 
following can be expressed by the following equation. 
𝐻𝐻𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚 = 𝐻𝐻𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚−1  𝑒𝑒∑ 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑+𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚
𝐷𝐷
𝑑𝑑=1  (1) 
Here, 𝐻𝐻𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚 is the fund’s i held value of security s reported in month m and 𝐻𝐻𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚−1 
is the held value of the same security s reported in the previous month.2 D is the number of 
trading days lying in between these reportings, e.g., around 21 for monthly reportings or 60 for 
quarterly reportings, and 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑 is the daily return of the position s at day d. It is therefore assumed 
 
2 The equation presented here reflects the monthly case but is the same when the fund reports quarterly. 
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that the value held at a given time is based on the value at the time of the previous reporting, 
increased by the daily return of the position and a constant daily flow 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚. For each fund in 
each month/quarter, this flow can be calculated as:  
𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚 =  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝐻𝐻𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚� − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝐻𝐻𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚−1� − ∑ 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑=1
𝐷𝐷
 (2) 
This variable has a value of zero if the change in the values held between two reportings 
can be fully explained by the daily return. However, it is not zero if the fund manager has 
actively changed his portfolio holdings and increased/decreased his position. Given that, the 
held value of each position on each day using a daily version of equation (1) can be recursively 
calculated, e.g.,  
𝐻𝐻𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,1 = 𝐻𝐻𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,0 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠,1+𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚 (3) 
𝐻𝐻𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,2 = 𝐻𝐻𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,0 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠,1+𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚+𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠,2+𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚 = 𝐻𝐻𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,1 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠,2+𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚 (4) 
𝐻𝐻𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,3 = 𝐻𝐻𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,0 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠,1+𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚+𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠,2+𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚+𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠,3+𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚= 𝐻𝐻𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,2 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠,3+𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚 
…. 
(5) 
where 𝐻𝐻𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,1 is the held value of fund i in stock s on day 1, 𝐻𝐻𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,2 the held value on 
day 2 and so forth. 
For each security held, the proposed model is therefore able to estimate a daily value 
that an investor would expect the fund to hold based on the disclosed holding positions and 
their daily return. With these approximated daily values for each of the held positions, the 
approximated fund return 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑














where 𝐻𝐻𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑 is the fund’s i (approximated) held value of security s at day d, 𝐻𝐻𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑 is 
the aggregated (approximated) held value of all securities of the fund i, N is the number of 
securities in the portfolio of fund i at day d and 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑 is the return on day d of security s. Therefore, 
this return time series represents the daily return of the fund that an investor would expect if the 
fund manager had traded as the reported positions implied between two reports. 
To ensure the most accurate approximation possible, it is important for the proposed 
methodology to ensure a precise and clear classification of all holding positions. As reported in 
Table 2, it was possible to classify over 99.5% of the holding positions of all the funds (2,802) 
in my sample, using the holding type reported by MSTAR as well as several string search 
algorithms and manual checks to ensure correct identification.3 In some rare cases (0.46%) it 
was not possible to correctly identify the position held due to missing or inaccurate data. 
Furthermore, it is not enough to achieve the most accurate classification possible; it is 
also necessary to ensure that the majority of positions are accurately identified and that the 
exact daily return can be assigned to the position. For securities where an exact identification 
was not possible, the returns are approximated with the return of an index, depending on the 
classified type of security. 
[Insert Table 2 here.] 
As expected for equity funds, over 96% of all held positions are common equities and 
nearly 91.8% of those stocks can be matched with their correct return. The remaining 8.2% are 
approximated with the return of the S&P500 or the MSCI World ex US depending on whether 
the stock is from the US or identified as an international stock. Around 0.9% of all the funds 
positions are identified as either corporate, governmental or municipal bonds and are fully 
approximated by the respective bond index. In some rare cases (0.33%) the observed funds are 
 
3 The other securities, which cannot be classified, are not considered below. 
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invested in other funds, of which over 40% can be correctly identified. The return series of the 
remaining held funds are approximated either with the S&P500, MSCI World ex US or the risk 
free rate depending on whether the fund held is a US equity fund, an international equity fund, 
or if the fund is identified as a cash-like money market fund. The identified positions in cash 
and repurchase agreements are also matched with the risk-free interest rate to act as the return 
the fund derives from these positions. As shown in Table 2 the funds also engage in derivatives 
such as swaps, options, futures, etc. As there is no way to accurately approximate the daily 
return on these positions and as shown by Natter et al. (2016) and Benz et al. (2019) the funds’ 
return is influenced by these instruments, all funds invested in any kind of derivatives, as 
already mentioned, are excluded from this study. 
3.3.2 Goodness of the approximation 
Since the approximated fund return is later compared with the actual fund return, the accuracy 
of the approximation must be ensured. As a first step, for each fund month and for each fund, 
the percentage of securities that can be correctly identified and matched to their actual return in 
relation to the total number of securities in the portfolio of the funds are examined. The higher 
the percentage of correctly identified positions, the higher the quality of the approximation 
should be. Table 3 Panel A shows descriptive statistics for these percentages. The identification 
rate seems to be rather high across all funds. There are just a few fund months with less than 
80% of correctly identified holdings while on average over 90% of all holdings are correctly 
identified. There are some fund months and even entire funds where the portfolio positions can 
be fully associated with their return time series. 
[Insert Table 3 here.] 
In a next step, the correlation between the daily approximated and actual return of the 
fund is investigated more closely. As shown above, the identification of the holding positions 
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was fairly accurate. If the approximated daily values of the held positions are close to the true 
daily values, the two resulting return time series should be similar and show a high correlation. 
The correlation for each fund month as well as for the whole fund are calculated and descriptive 
statistics for the correlation coefficients are reported in Panel B. As it can be seen the 
correlations are quite high with an average of over 98% for the fund months, while even the 
smallest 1% correlation is still over 85%. A similar pattern is shown when looking at the 
correlation calculated for the funds as a whole. 
In a final test of the quality of the approximation, the two checks above are combined, 
and the funds are sorted according to the percentage of correctly identified positions into 
deciles. For each decile, the average correlation between the approximated and actual return of 
the funds as well as the average standard deviation of the monthly correlation of the 
approximated and actual return per fund are calculated and reported in Panel C. A pattern that 
one would have suspected when looking at the previous tests is shown. The higher the 
percentage of correctly identified holding positions, the higher the correlation between the 
approximated and actual return. Furthermore, these funds also have the lowest standard 
deviation, which means that the approximation for these funds is also the most consistent over 
time. All the above-mentioned tests indicate a successful approximation of the daily holding 
structure of the funds, which is crucial for further analyses in this study. 
3.3.3 Performance and risk measures 
To determine the impact of interim trading on them afterwards, various performance and risk 
measures for both the approximate and the actual daily fund return are calculated.4 I use the 
monthly standard deviation of the daily return series, 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 and 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, as measures of the 
 
4 Since the approximated fund return is calculated without taking any costs into account, the gross version of the 
actual return instead of a net return is used. 
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overall risk of the fund i in month t. For each fund month, I estimate further measures of 
performance and risk based on the two daily returns series using the CAPM following Jensen 
(1968). 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓,𝑑𝑑 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓,𝑑𝑑) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 (7) 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓,𝑑𝑑 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 +  𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓,𝑑𝑑) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 (8) 
In these models, 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 is the approximated fund return of fund i introduced in section 
3.3.1 while 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 is the actual fund return of fund i on day d in month t. 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡 is the daily 
market return and 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓,𝑑𝑑 equals the risk-free rate.5  
The main parameters of interest are the risk-adjusted performance measures 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 and 
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 and the systematic risk measures 𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎and 𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 of the fund i in the month t, both 
of which are estimated for either the approximated or the actual return series. I further use the 
monthly standard deviation of the residuals 𝜎𝜎(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) and 𝜎𝜎(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) as measures for the 
idiosyncratic risk found in the funds’ portfolio in month t. 
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 =  𝜎𝜎(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)  (9) 
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 =  𝜎𝜎(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)  (10) 
 
 Interim trading measure and its relation to the fund’s performance 
3.4.1 Interim trading 
Due to the low frequency of the reports, investors in mutual funds cannot observe all actions of 
the fund managers. They might trade between reportings without the investor knowing or 
 




expecting it. These interim trades could be beneficial to the investor if an informed fund 
manager uses his information advantage to time his trades and thereby enhance fund 
performance. However, these trades could also impair the performance of the fund due to costs, 
such as agency as well as trading costs, or could change the risk structure of the fund 
unfavorably for some investors.  
To measure the interim trading activity and its impact on different risk and performance 
measures of mutual funds an extension of a model similar to Kacperczyk et al. (2008) is used. 
They calculate the funds’ interim trading as the return gap resulting from the difference of the 
actual fund return and the return of a portfolio investing in the previously disclosed fund 
holdings. The effects of interim trading are included in the actual return, but not in the return 
on the most recently reported holdings. They therefore define interim trading as any deviation 
in the holding structure from the last reported holdings.  
In this study, their model is extended by comparing the actual risk of a fund to the risk 
measure calculated for the approximated daily return. As mentioned above, the approximated 
return series and therefore the risk measures calculated for this return, reflects the trading 
behavior of the funds, which can be derived from the reported holdings. In contrast, the time 
series of the actual return and the risk measures calculated from it reflects the actual daily 
trading activity of the respective fund. The remaining differences arising between the risk 
measures calculated for the two return time series are assumed to be driven by the interim 
trading that is not anticipated by the holding changes. Therefore, interim trading within two 
reports is defined as a deviation from the expected holding structure, rather than the last known 
holding structure, which is a more accurate way to measure unobserved trading. 
By comparing two measures of risk, it is possible to determine not only whether the 
fund trades between two reportings, but also whether this trading activity results in a higher or 
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lower risk than the reported holdings imply. I calculate the interim risk measure for each fund 
i in month t as  
𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 (11) 
where 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  (𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) is one of the three monthly risk measures (described in 
section 3.3.3) calculated for the actual and the approximated return series introduced in section 
3.3.1. A positive interim risk measure indicates that the actual risk exceeds that of the 
approximated portfolio, i.e. the fund manager has increased the risk between two reports beyond 
the level that can be anticipated by the holdings. A negative interim risk measure indicates that 
the fund manager actually shows a lower risk than the change in reportings imply. If the risk 
measure is close to zero, the fund manager did not actively change its risk in between but rather 
shows a similar risk as expected by the reported holding change, i.e. the fund manager does not 
show interim trading behavior. 
Table 4 reports the mean values of the risk measures of the two return time series as 
well as the respective interim risk measure.  
[Insert Table 4 here.] 
As shown in Panel A, the differences in all risk measures are significant and positive, 
indicating that the actual risk differs from the risk that one would expect from the reported two 
consecutive portfolios. Fund managers therefore tend to increase their risk between two reports, 
which I attribute to the executed intermediate trades that cannot be implied from the holdings.  
Certainly, the pooled average does not paint an accurate picture and the fund managers’ 
trading behavior might differ from month to month. Therefore, Panel B reports a quintile 
division of the interim risk measure. Within each fund, individual months are categorized into 
quintiles based on their interim risk measure. Here, quintile 1 contains the months in which the 
 
30 
risk difference is most negative, i.e. the actual fund risk within the month is lower than implied 
by the holdings, and quintile 5 contains the months with the most positive risk difference. The 
middle quintiles contain the months in which the actual trading behavior of the managers is 
similar to that of the implied, approximated one, and the risk measures therefore do not show 
large differences. For each of the quintiles the average of the respective interim risk measure is 
reported based on the overall, the systematic or the idiosyncratic risk. As shown by the 
significant the significant differences between the first and fifth quintiles, there are distinct 
differences in the interim actions of the fund managers from month to month. 
3.4.2 Relation of interim trading and performance 
As shown above, fund managers on average tend to increase their risk compared to the risk 
anticipated from the reports. Nonetheless, the pooled average does not show exactly what fund 
managers do when no one is watching, and as shown by the quintile division the fund managers 
act differently across months. They increase their risk compared to the approximated risk in 
one month and show a different behavior in another. In a next step, the influence of this 
changing trading behavior on different performance measures of the funds is examined more 
closely. Therefore, the funds are again divided into quintiles according to one of their interim 
trading measures, using the same scheme as before in Table 4 Panel B. For each of the quintiles 
the average annualized risk-adjusted gross performance as well as the monthly gross return are 
reported. This provides a first impression of whether different fund strategies, with regard to 
interim trading, lead to differences in gross performance and return for the respective fund 
month. 
[Insert Table 5 here.] 
Looking at the risk-adjusted performance as a measure of the fund managers skill, it is 
noticeable that an excessive deviation (both positive and negative, i.e. the 1st and 5th quintile) 
 
31 
of the actual overall risk from the approximated overall risk comes with an higher risk-adjusted 
performance compared to months with less pronounced interim trading, i.e. the middle 
quintiles. However, when comparing the most positive and negative risk differences (i.e. the 5th 
and 1st quintile), no significant difference in the risk-adjusted performance is found. When the 
overall risk is decomposed into systematic and idiosyncratic risk, a different pattern arises. In 
months in which the interim trading decreases the funds’ actual systematic risk compared to the 
systematic risk of the approximated portfolio, the funds show a significant outperformance of 
0.34%. On the contrary, a higher systematic risk than that implied by the holdings is not 
rewarded with a higher performance, the funds have significantly underperformed in these 
months by -0.06%. When interim trading is measured based on the idiosyncratic risk, the pattern 
is reversed, which is not surprising given the opposite direction of systematic and idiosyncratic 
risk. If the actions of the fund managers in between reportings increase idiosyncratic risk above 
the level implied by the reportings, funds show a significantly higher performance compared to 
the first quintile (0.28%). A possible explanation for this relation could be, that in order to 
achieve a risk-adjusted outperformance, the fund manager has to deviate from its benchmark, 
i.e. increasing its idiosyncratic risk, for which securities with high idiosyncratic risk could 
potentially be used to outperform the benchmark (Falkenstein, 1996). 
However, if the gross return is taken into account, a different picture is given. Excessive 
interim trading, as deviation of the approximated risk, is associated with lower gross returns 
compared to months in which the funds’ managers tend to trade as implied by the holding 
changes. When comparing these extreme scenarios, it becomes clear that taking a higher than 
implied risk is significantly more disadvantageous for the gross return of the funds, which even 
leads to a slightly negative gross return (-0.03%). This pattern is driven by the idiosyncratic 
risk which shows the same pattern. Consequently, an excessive deviation of the systematic risk, 
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neither positive nor negative, from the expected systematic risk does not mean that the fund 
generates a higher return in these months. 
The descriptive quintile division above gives a first impression of the relation of interim 
trading and the fund’s performance. However, the identified relation could also be driven by 
different fund characteristics. Therefore, taking into account various fund characteristics, 
regression analyses are used to determine the influence of interim trading on fund performance. 
Monthly panel regressions following equation (8) are carried out where 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
is either the actual risk-adjusted gross performance or the gross return. The fund’s size, 
expenses, turnover, a load dummy, age and the fund flow are included as controlsi,t,j. 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
= 𝜑𝜑0 + 𝜑𝜑1 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡





The two main variables of interest, 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 and 
𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, are dummy variables indicating whether the fund i engages in 
interim trading in this month, showing higher or lower actual risk than anticipated from the 
reported holdings. With before used the 𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 measure, any risk difference between 
the actual and approximated risk was treated as if it resulted from a fund’s interim trading 
actions. This seems slightly too strict due to the approximation aspect of the method used. I 
therefore define each fund month as an interim trading month if the interim risk measure is 
greater (smaller) than the fund’s average interim risk measure plus (minus) the volatility of the 
risk difference.6 In this way I control for differences in the quality of approximation across 
 
6 As a robustness check, the quintile division introduced above is used to redefine interim trading. Here, positive 
interim trading is defined as all the fund months in the 5th quintile and negative interim trading as fund months 
from the 1st quintile. The results remain the same. 
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funds and identify only those months as interim trading months in which the interim trading 
action for a particular fund is excessive, resulting in a higher or lower risk than expected by the 
holdings. 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡









Hereby, 𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the measure introduced in section 3.4.1, based on the overall, 
systematic or idiosyncratic risk of the fund. Table 6 reports the results of time-fixed effects 
panel regressions with clustered standard errors to examine the influence of the interim trading 
on the funds’ gross performance and return. 
[Insert Table 6 here.]  
The results from the quintile division hold even after controlling for different fund 
characteristics and time fixed effects. Funds engaging in interim trading measured by the overall 
risk show an increased risk-adjusted performance. Again, if the overall risk is decomposed into 
the systematic and idiosyncratic part, the two interim trading directions have different 
influences on the risk-adjusted performance. Fund managers significantly increase their 
performance by decreasing their systematic risk or by increasing their idiosyncratic risk 
compared to the risk level implied by the reported holdings. 
The regression analyses also support the finding that excessive interim trading has a 
negative impact on the funds’ gross return, probably due to increased trading costs coming with 
an increased trading behavior. Similarly, as already shown in the descriptive statistics, this 
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relationship is determined by the intermediate increase or decrease in idiosyncratic risk rather 
than by a deviation of the systematic risk compared to the approximated one. 
 Conclusion 
In this study, a new model to measure the interim trading behavior of mutual funds is proposed. 
The tendency of the funds to engage in interim trading is measured, whereby interim trading is 
defined as the difference between the actual fund risk and the risk calculated for an approximate 
return series, implied by the reported holdings of the funds. It is demonstrated that fund 
managers tend to show, on average, a higher risk than the reported holdings imply, which is 
attributed to their interim trading behavior. However, fund managers do not exhibit the same 
trading behavior every month, but rather change their behavior from month to month. There are 
months in which managers deviate excessively from their implied risk, either positively or 
negatively, and months in which the actual risk of the funds is similar to the approximated risk. 
In months of high deviation, i.e. higher level of interim trading, funds show an increased 
risk-adjusted gross performance. Managers achieve this either by strongly reducing the 
systematic risk or by strongly increasing the idiosyncratic risk compared to the respective risk 
implied by the holdings. In contrast, an excessive deviation, either positive or negative, from 
the approximated overall risk leads to a reduced gross return. Managers who strongly increase 
their overall risk above the level implied by the reportings even show a slightly negative return 
before costs. This relation is mainly driven by the increased idiosyncratic risk taken by the fund 
manager, whereas a deviation from the expected systematic risk does not result in any 
differences in their gross return.  
These relations are still evident and significant even after controlling for different fund 
characteristics and time-fixed effects. The results shown indicate that funds engaging in 
excessive trading in between two reportings, measured by intermediate increase or decrease of 
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their overall risk, show a higher risk-adjusted performance but lower gross return. It seems that 
the excessive interim trading by fund managers is aimed at making their performance look 
better. This phenomenon could be driven by the fact that some fund managers are compensated 
by their performance relative to a benchmark (Ma et al., 2019). At the same time, however, the 
fund managers are not able to take advantage of this increased trading activity, measured against 
overall risk, to generate higher gross returns. The acquired results highlight the importance of 
an adequate consideration of the interim trading activities of investment fund managers and 
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Table 1 – Pooled descriptive statistics of fund variables 
 
 
  Panel A: All Funds Panel B: Non-derivative using Funds 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
Net return (% p.m.) 0.0065 0.0111 0.0060 0.0103 
Gross return (% p.m.) 0.0075 0.0121 0.0071 0.0113 
Expense ratio (% TNA, p.a.) 0.0123 0.0119 0.0125 0.0119 
Turnover ratio (% TNA, p.a.) 0.8168 0.6400 0.7406 0.5400 
Load fund 0.7223 1.0000 0.6527 1.0000 
Age (in months) 152.65 124.00 114.59 86.00 
TNA ($ mil.) 1,189.15 239.20 864.92 201.20 
Net Flow (% TNA) 0.0086 -0.0027 0.0133 -0.0005 
     
     
This table reports pooled descriptive statistics of the various fund variables used in later research from 1997 to 2015. 
Panel A shows the descriptive statistics for all 2,802 funds. Panel B shows the descriptive statistics for 835 non-
derivative using funds. 
 
Table 2 – Number of observations and quality of identification for different instrument types 
 
 
 Number of Observations in % True Return Approximated by in % 
Stocks 44,902,140 96.88% 91.80% SP500 6.04% 
    MSCI World (ex US) 2.16% 
Corporate Bonds 345,563 0.75%  Corporate Bond Index 100% 
Government Bonds 74,928 0.16%  Government Bond Index 100% 
Municipal Bonds 3,489 0.01%  Municipal Bond Index 100% 
Funds 28,785 0.06% 
40.28% 
SP500 5.01% 
Moneymarket Funds 125,024 0.27% MSCI World (ex US) 10.41% 
    Risk free rate 43.89% 
Cash 244,040 0.53%  Risk free rate 100% 
Repo 69,491 0.15%  Risk free rate 100% 
MBS 75,385 0.16%  
Complex Instruments 1.35% 
Swaps 4,449 0.01%  
Options 127,318 0.27%  
Futures 47,877 0.10%  
Warrants 57,589 0.12%  
Units 29,891 0.06%  
Not Identified 212,220 0.46%  
Total  46,348,189 100.00%    
      
      
This table reports the overall number of observations identified as the respective holding type as well as the percentage 






Table 3 – Goodness of the approximation 
 
 
Panel A. Correlation of approximated and actual return 
      
 Min 1% 10% 25% 50% Mean 75% 90% 99% Max 
Correlation fund 
month 0.98% 85.43% 97.39% 98.90% 99.57% 98.70% 99.84% 99.93% 99.99% 100.00% 
Correlation fund 23.96% 84.05% 96.84% 98.30% 99.14% 98.28% 99.55% 99.75% 99.90% 99.95% 
Standard Deviation 
monthly correlation 0.08% 0.15% 0.42% 0.75% 1.48% 2.46% 2.80% 5.57% 12.71% 38.25% 
           
Panel B. Proportion of the correctly identified and matched positions  
           
 Min 1% 10% 25% 50% Mean 75% 90% 99% Max 
% of fund month 0.00% 72.68% 84.00% 88.14% 92.54% 91.58% 96.27% 98.41% 100.00% 100.00% 
% of fund 19.32% 75.08% 84.89% 88.78% 92.06% 91.37% 94.94% 97.52% 99.75% 100.00% 
           
Panel C. Decile division 
 
Decile Mean Standard Deviation of Fund Correlation  Mean Fund Correlation  
1 (77.60%) 5.53%  92.83% 
2 (85.32%) 3.29%  97.59% 
3 (88.00%) 2.92%  98.16% 
4 (89.41%) 3.05%  98.33% 
5 (90.55%) 2.91%  97.92% 
6 (91.55%) 2.16%  98.83% 
7 (92.42%) 2.12%  98.71% 
8 (93.66%) 2.65%  98.89% 
9 (95.06%) 1.42%  99.24% 
10 (97.83%) 1.13%  99.35% 
       
      
This table reports tests for the goodness of the approximation. Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the correlation 
of approximated and actual return calculated on fund month and fund level as well as the standard deviation of the 
correlation on fund month level. Panel B reports the proportion of the positions that can be identified and matched to 
the actual return. In Panel C, I sort the funds according to the percentage of correctly identified positions into deciles 
(presented in parentheses). For the funds in each decile, I then report the average standard deviation of the correlation 





Table 4 – Interim Risk Measure 
 
 
Panel A. Descriptive statistic  
 
 Actual Approximated Difference  (Interim Risk) 
Overall Risk 0.0117 0.0114 0.0004*** 
Systematic Risk 1.0364 1.0297 0.0067*** 
Idiosyncratic Risk 0.0064 0.0061 0.0003*** 
 
Panel B. Quintile division 
 
 Overall Risk Systematic Risk Idiosyncratic Risk 
1 -0.0007 -0.1083 -0.0005 
2 -0.0001 -0.0215 -0.0002 
3 0.0002 0.0028 0.0001 
4 0.0005 0.0290 0.0004 
5 0.0018 0.1314 0.0015 
5 - 1 0.0025*** 0.2396*** 0.0020*** 
 
For the actual and the approximated return time series, Panel A reports the pooled averages of the overall, systematic, 
and idiosyncratic risk, as well as their difference, the interim risk measure. Panel B reports a quintile division for each 
of the interim risk measures. Within each fund, the individual months are categorized into quintiles based on their interim 
risk measure and the average interim risk measure is reported for each quintile. Statistical significance is measured by 
two-sided t-tests and *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
Table 5 – Relation of interim trading and performance - Quintile classification 
 
 
 Panel A. Risk-adjusted Gross Performance  Panel B. Gross Return 
    
Interim Trading 
  




 Overall Risk Systematic 
 
Idiosyncratic 
 1 0.0025*** 0.0034*** 0.0012***  0.0061*** 0.0069*** 0.0050*** 
2 0.0023*** 0.0026*** 0.0015***  0.0128*** 0.0069*** 0.0105*** 
3 0.0019*** 0.0028*** 0.0021***  0.0127*** 0.0069*** 0.0111*** 
4 0.0014*** 0.0024*** 0.0020***  0.0093*** 0.0079*** 0.0090*** 
5 0.0027*** -0.0006** 0.0040***  -0.0003 0.0069*** -0.0003 
5 - 1 0.0002 -0.0039*** 0.0028***  -0.0064*** 0.0000 -0.0053*** 
        
This table reports the quintile division of the fund months based on the magnitude of the respective interim risk measure. 
For each of the quintiles I report in Panel A the average annualized risk-adjusted gross performance and in Panel B the 
monthly gross return. Statistical significance is measured by one-sided t-tests against zero and *, **, and *** denote 





Table 6 – Relation of interim trading and performance – Panel Regressions 
 
 
 Panel A. Risk-adjusted Gross Performance  Panel B.Gross Return 
    
Negative Interim Trading 
(Overall Risk) 
0.0006**    -0.0057***   
(0.02)    (0.00)   
Positive Interim Trading 
(Overall Risk) 
0.0009***    -0.0167***   
(0.00)    (0.00)   
Negative Interim Trading 
(Systematic Risk) 
 0.0007**    -0.0006  
 (0.02)    (0.17)  
Positive Interim Trading 
(Systematic Risk) 
 -0.0032***    -0.0002  
 (0.00)    (0.64)  
Negative Interim Trading 
(Idiosyncratic Risk) 
  -0.0008**    -0.0054*** 
  (0.03)    (0.00) 
Positive Interim Trading 
(Idiosyncratic Risk) 
  0.0022***    -0.0103*** 
  (0.00)    (0.00) 
Log TNA 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004***  0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Expense Ratio 0.4774*** 0.4778*** 0.4773***  0.6338*** 0.6336*** 0.6338*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Turnover Ratio -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0005***  -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Load Dummy -0.0012*** -0.0012*** -0.0012***  -0.0012*** -0.0013*** -0.0012*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000***  0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000** 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Flow 0.0134*** 0.0133*** 0.0133***  0.0152*** 0.0152*** 0.0153*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -0.0047*** -0.0045*** -0.0048***  -0.0017** -0.0016* -0.0018**  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) 
        
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.010 0.012 0.010  0.013 0.013 0.012 
Number of Observations 73.607 73.607 73.607  73.607 73.607 73607 
        
        
This table reports the results of monthly panel regressions with time-fixed effects and clustered standard errors to examine 
the influence of the interim trading on the funds’ gross performance and return for 835 US domestic equity mutual funds 
from 1997 to 2015. The funds’ size, expenses, turnover, a load dummy, age, and the fund flow are included as control 
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Abstract. This article examines the exposure to and management of carbon risks of different 
investor types. Considering the dual role as portfolio manager and partial owner, we analyze 
carbon risk for investors both in terms of exposure to portfolio values and in terms of 
responsibility as shareholder of carbon-intensive firms. We show that among various investor 
types the preference for holding carbon-intensive stocks differs substantially, even when 
considering traditional investment decision parameters. In particular, it is governments whose 
portfolio values are most threatened by a carbon risk exposure of 49%, but at the same time 
they prefer larger ownership shares in polluting firms. In contrast, individual investors, 
investment advisors and mutual funds avoid holding stakes in these firms, while revealing only 
a moderate exposure of their assets to carbon risk. In view of the Paris Agreement, which 
includes the consistent steering of financial flows towards a low carbon transformation of the 
economy, our study provides policymakers with important implications regarding the coverage 
and effects of respective regulations. By identifying the ownership structures of carbon-
intensive firms and respective owners’ portfolio compositions, we also offer implications for 
further research on portfolio decarbonization and shareholders’ influence of corporate carbon 
management. 
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Abstract. This article provides a novel methodology to investigate the influence of share 
ownership on corporate decision making. Quantifying the characteristics of firms’ owners 
based on their measurable investment habits enables us to assess their predominant preferences. 
We demonstrate that a preference by owners for eco-social investments is a positive force in 
their firms’ CSR performance. In contrast, firms exhibit a lower CSR performance when owners 
show a higher degree of heterogeneity in terms of eco-social preferences. Furthermore, we find 
that universal as well as long-term ownerships significantly encourage CSR, hence confirming 
prominent theoretical concepts.  
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 Introduction  
The question of whether and how the interests of a firm’s owners influence corporate decision 
making has been a focus of the literature on financial economics and management for quite 
some time. Studies on the subject usually approximate owner preferences by simply imputing 
pre-defined characteristics to specific investor types1 whose aggregate ownership share in the 
firm is known (e.g., Oswald and Jahera, 1991, David et al., 1998, Piotroski and Roulstone, 
2004, among others). However, this approach omits heterogeneous preferences within owner 
types and neglects the preferences of owners assigned to other types.  
In this article, we propose an innovative two-step approach to measuring the preferences 
of corporate ownership that renders any previous attribution or categorization of owners 
obsolete. In the first step, each owner’s characteristics are measured based on their equity 
portfolio holdings. In the second step, by constructing a “portfolio of owners” for each firm, we 
are able to measure the corporate ownership’s dominating preferences as the share-weighted 
average of the owners’ characteristics.2 While this methodological refinement is generally 
applicable to ownership preferences regarding any quantifiable firm characteristic, this article 
concentrates on a question that is the current focus of public and scientific interest and at the 
same time of high societal relevance – namely, do owners have an influence on corporate social 
responsibility (CSR)? 
In their role as transformers of lot size, maturity, and risk, participants in the financial 
market have an influence on economic growth and thus, to a considerable extent, on our society. 
Their expectations and attitudes have societal effects ranging from the way investee firms 
operate at the micro-level to macroeconomic trends (Levine, 2008). As a consequence, society 
 
1 Like, e.g., hedge funds as aggressive and short-term or pension funds as conservative and long-term. 
2 In this article, the terms “investor” and “owner” are used as synonyms and denote a single equity investor of a 
firm. The term “ownership” describes the aggregate of all corporate owners, i.e. the firm’s “portfolio of owners”. 
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expects appropriate business behavior (Wood, 1991). Financial markets therefore have a social 
responsibility, underlined not least by the Paris Agreement, which considers the allocation of 
financial flows in line with low-carbon and climate-resistant development as one of its central 
aims (UNFCCC, 2015) 
Given the sharp increase in socially responsible investments worldwide3, it appears that 
a growing number of generally institutional but also individual investors are willing to shoulder 
this responsibility by integrating sustainability criteria into their investment decision-making. 
In addition to traditionally norm-constrained investors such as pension funds and religious 
organizations (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009), examples include voluntary initiatives such as the 
Portfolio Decarbonization Coalition (PDC) or Principles of Responsible Investment (PRI), as 
well as investors with appropriate investment objectives (e.g., SRI funds). The integrated 
sustainability criteria go far beyond climate change and cover a broad spectrum of 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) aspects (van Duuren et al., 2016). In parallel to 
their functions as capital allocators, investors are also partial owners of the actual primary 
source of economic and eco-social prosperity, i.e. the corporations. Not a new insight, but one 
that became apparent recently in Larry Fink’s highly regarded letter to CEOs, in which the 
world’s largest asset manager undertakes to fulfill his (fiduciary) social responsibility as an 
investor and as active owner (BlackRock, 2020).  
With our central research question, we establish a link between these two roles and 
investigate whether the eco-social preferences of a firm’s investors, reflected in the ESG scores 
of their portfolios, also influence that firm’s CSR performance. Our methodological refinement 
allows us to test the corresponding hypotheses empirically, explicitly taking into account the 
heterogeneity of owners’ preferences, which is suspected of hampering management’s 
 
3 According to the Global Sustainable Investment Alliance (GSIA), sustainable investments increased by 66% 
between 2014 and 2018, see GSIA (2018). 
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decision-making in the need to heed the owners’ possibly opposing interests (Goranova and 
Ryan, 2014). Moreover, based on theoretical deductions including the concepts of universal 
(Hawley and Williams, 2007) and long-term investors (Bãnabou and Tirole, 2010), we identify 
and test additional owner characteristics that might suggest a preference for or a link to CSR.  
To be able to identify the owners’ characteristics in the first step and then aggregate 
owners’ preferences at corporate level in the second step, we compile an extensive global 
ownership and stock dataset that includes 28,201 firms, which on average cover 93% of the 
annual worldwide market capitalization during the period from 2002 to 2017. For these firms, 
we achieve an ownership coverage of 65% on an annual average. To the best of our knowledge, 
this sample is unsurpassed in global coverage of ownership information, aggregated market 
capitalization, number of observed firms and length of observation period. 
Our methodological development builds on a broad base of quantified owner 
characteristics and demonstrates that there is considerable heterogeneity within the investor 
types previously treated as homogeneous. The empirical results show that firms whose investors 
show predominantly stronger portfolio-based ESG preferences are significantly increasing their 
efforts to improve CSR. This is especially the case with regard to environmental and corporate 
governance issues, and less for social concerns. These findings indicate that investors’ 
commitment to sustainability is not limited to the portfolio level, but also includes an 
engagement as corporate owners. In contrast, firms exhibit a lower CSR performance with 
owners who show a higher degree of heterogeneity in terms of eco-social preferences. This 
suggests that conflicting voices reduce management’s decision-making ability through the need 
to reconcile disparate corporate owners’ desires as well as reduce the possibility of 
collaboration among active shareholders. Further, consistent with the theoretical assumption 
that so-called universal owners promote CSR activities in their own interest, we find a positive 
relationship between CSR performance and the average number of firms held by corporate 
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owners. Likewise, we find that the CSR efforts of a firm critically depend on its owners’ 
investment horizon and thus support the hypothesis that long-term ownership encourages CSR 
activities.  
We avoid endogeneity concerns by adjusting the ownership characteristics used in our 
main analysis as explanatory variables for the variation in firm characteristics (CSR). Since 
owner characteristics themselves were determined based on firm characteristics, we thus 
eliminate the individual contribution of the respective firm to the calculated owner 
characteristics. The firm-level aggregate of corporate owners’ characteristics, referred to as 
“ownership characteristics”, does not therefore depend on the respective firm itself. 
Furthermore, we address concerns regarding the reverse causality of our results. By conducting 
(Granger) causality tests, we provide evidence that our coefficient estimates are not driven by 
positive or negative screening based on ESG criteria in the owners’ investment decision 
processes. Several other tests, including the use of ESG data from an alternative data provider, 
the different consideration of time-invariant effects, as well as other control variables, confirm 
the robustness of our analyses. 
This article contributes generally to the ongoing debate on the separation of ownership 
and control in publicly listed corporations (e.g., Vernon, 1970, Claessens et al., 2000, among 
others). In doing so, we empirically show that shareholders influence corporate decisions, 
which is evidence against their having a purely passive role as characterized by Berle and 
Means (1932). Second, our innovative methodological approach precludes the criticism 
regarding the blanket attribution of investors based on a predefined typology and the associated 
neglect of conflicting preferences in their functions as active owners (e.g., Bagwell, 1991, 
Hoskisson et al., 2002). While this article focuses exclusively on CSR, the methodology 
developed here can be universally adapted to any quantifiable firm characteristic, opening a 
wide field for further research. Third, our tests regarding investors’ CSR engagement address 
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the issue of whether shareholders have an influence on the environmental, social and 
governance policies of their firms. We also confirm the literature that has already answered this 
question in the affirmative. Our study is neither a substitute for, nor a contradiction of, these 
studies, but rather a completion that does not restrict itself to a specific group of owners (like, 
e.g., Dyck et al., 2019 and Chen et al., 2020) or a single channel through which owners can 
exercise influence (like, e.g., Dimson et al., 2015). And fourth, for the first time to the best of 
our knowledge, we empirically test and confirm prominent theoretical concepts concerning the 
positive influence of long-term (Bãnabou and Tirole, 2010) and universal ownership (Hawley 
and Williams, 2007) on CSR. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 5.2 places our contribution 
in the context of existing approaches to investigating shareholders' influence on corporate 
decision-making and concludes by developing hypotheses on how ownership characteristics 
influence CSR. In section 5.3, we introduce the data and present summary statistics of our 
sample. Section 5.4 contains a detailed explanation of the methodological approach. Section 
5.5 presents the results on whether ownership preferences are linked to CSR performance, 
verifies them for (Granger) causality, and gives an overview of conducted robustness tests. 
Section 5.6 concludes. 
 Theoretical Background and Hypothesis Development 
5.2.1  Integration into existing research and contributions 
In their renowned book “The Modern Corporation and Private Property” published in 1932, 
Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means postulated that the separation of ownership and control has 
become a common characteristic of large US public companies. In their appraisal, shareholders 
have a more or less inactive role within the company and have only a very limited effect on 
corporate decision-making. As a result of this assessment, the question of how (and whether) 
 
50 
the interests of corporate owners can be represented and fulfilled by the management has been 
increasingly discussed and empirically examined.  
Beginning with and based on agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), corporate 
governance mechanisms, such as performance-oriented compensation or controlling by outside 
directors, were established to subtly balance the interests of shareholders and corporate 
management. The relevance of these mechanisms for shareholder value is confirmed by several 
studies (e.g., Cremers and Nair, 2005, Bebchuk et al., 2009, among others).  
In addition to the need of management to take owners’ interest into account contingent 
on contractual or organizational arrangements, Hirschman (2004) formulated fundamental and 
direct response options that owners may exercise in the absence of satisfactory corporate 
(management) performance, namely “exit” and “voice”.4 “Exit” simply describes the 
shareholders’ option to express their dissatisfaction by selling shares. To verify the 
effectiveness of this strategy, Parrino et al. (2003) find empirical support for the hypothesis that 
changes in shareholder composition influence the board’s decisions. Of course, the exited 
owners do not benefit from this response, but Admati and Pfleiderer (2009) see the mere threat 
of an exit as a disciplinary tool to impact managerial behavior − the hazard of divestment thus 
represents a hybrid between “exit” and the second response option “voice”. Apart from this 
rather indirect and informal approach, exercising their rights as partial owners is a traditional 
way for shareholders to “voice” displeasure with management. In this context, several empirical 
studies examine the response to and success of shareholder proposals (Gordon and Pound, 1993, 
Karpoff et al., 1996, and Gillan and Starks, 2000, among others).  
McCahery et al. (2016) argue that many interventions by shareholders also take place 
behind the scenes. These personal interactions with corporate representatives are therefore 
 
4 Hirschman  (2004) also mentioned a third option “loyalty”, which will not be discussed in this article. 
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generally not applicable to empirical research. An exception is a work by Carleton et al. (1998), 
which relies on a private database of the correspondence between TIAA-CREF5 and investee 
firms. It shows that a high proportion of agreements on corporate governance issues are reached 
without shareholders voting and that the targeted firms also initiate actions to fulfill these 
agreements. 
Without limiting themselves to concrete channels and to overcome the problem of 
hidden shareholder activism, many scholars focus on specifically characterized owner groups 
and use their aggregated ownership share in the respective firm as a “potential for influence”. 
The underlying idea is obvious: the higher the share of a certain group of owners, the more 
likely it is that corporate decisions will be guided by their interests or characteristics. For 
example, Cornett et al. (2007) argue that institutional investors, as owners with stronger 
monitoring capabilities, pressure firms to act in the best interest of shareholders and confirm a 
positive relationship between institutional ownership and firms’ operating cash flow returns. A 
disadvantage of this approach is the assumption that the owners of a group have the same 
interests and act with a unified voice. Hoskisson et al. (2002) show that there are heterogeneous 
preferences within the group of institutional investors depending on the type of investor, and 
argue that these potentially conflicting voices should be taken into account.  
One attempt to reduce this intra-group heterogeneity is to define more granular owner 
groups. For example, Borisova et al. (2015) find support for the hypothesis that high 
government ownership is generally associated with a higher cost of debt, consistent with state-
induced investment distortions. Boubakri et al. (2013) interpret foreign investors as owners 
who are more likely to undertake capital budgeting decisions and find a positive relationship 
between foreign ownership share and earnings volatility of newly privatized firms. Dyck et al. 
 
5 Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association – College Retirement Equities Fund  
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(2019) characterize pension funds as long-term investors and hedge funds as short-term 
investors and show that pension funds, in contrast to hedge funds, promote the environmental 
performance of firms. However, this approach can also be criticized with the same argument, 
namely that it cannot be assumed that owners even within a more granular group are 
homogeneous and have identical preferences, (e.g., Çelik and Isaksson (2014)) or that other 
owners of the same firm who do not belong to the group under consideration can be neglected. 
The interests of these omitted owners could indeed conflict with those of the examined owner 
group. Since the corporate executives are obliged to consider the preferences of all owners 
according to their voting rights, this requires a methodical approach that respects the individual 
preferences of all owners, taking into account their respective ownership shares. 
Our contribution addresses these points of criticism and represents a methodological 
improvement for investigating the relationship between ownership and corporate policy. First, 
unlike previous approaches, we do not distinguish between pre-aggregated owner groups but 
refer to the level of single investors or investment companies. Second, we include all 
identifiable owners of a company and thus also take into account their potentially competing 
preferences. Third, we use only measurable owner characteristics that reflect their preferences 
and are therefore independent of assumptions about the preferences of different owners, owner 
groups, or types. This represents a significant improvement over previous approaches and is 
generally applicable to ownership preferences regarding any quantifiable firm characteristic. 
Besides this methodological refinement, we also contribute to an emerging research 
focus examining the impact of shareholders on CSR. Following the Friedman doctrine, 
companies fulfill the exclusive purpose of maximizing shareholder value (Friedman, 1970). On 
that note, shareholders’ values are described as purely monetary and their role as rational utility 
maximizers. Accordingly, Gillan and Starks (1998) see the inherent motivation of active 
shareholders as the reduction of agency conflicts and the associated costs that counteract the 
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growth of their values. Non-financial motives for owners to become engaged, especially with 
regard to the company’s social and environmental impact, do not at a first glance fit into this 
framework.  
To still be compatible with the classic shareholder primacy view, many scholars seek to 
establish a link between CSR and firms’ financial performance. In a survey of more than 2,200 
individual studies from 1978 to 2015, Friede et al. (2015) conclude that the large majority report 
a positive relation between ESG criteria and corporate financial performance. This argues in 
favor of theories summarized by Bãnabou and Tirole (2010) under the banner of “doing well 
by doing good”. 
A second approach to explaining CSR engagements is to rethink the definition of 
“shareholder value”. Among others, Hart and Zingales (2017) argue that owners consider social 
and ethical factors as well as externalities generated by the corporation’s profit-making 
activities. Thus, rather than maximizing shareholder wealth in the sense of market value, the 
appropriate objective should be shareholder welfare, which is defined as the combination of 
shareholder wealth and negative externalities. Even if CSR investments are expected to lower 
financial returns, investors may value a firm’s social expenditures (Baron, 2008) – a prosocial 
investor attitude that Bãnabou and Tirole (2010) subsume as “delegated philanthropy”. 
5.2.2 Testable hypotheses 
Regardless of whether their original motives are financial or philanthropic (or both), a growing 
number of investors advocate including CSR criteria in their investment decisions and 
engagement priorities. For example, the Portfolio Decarbonization Coalition (PDC), whose 
signatories manage assets of over US$ 3,200 billion, is pushing for a reduction in greenhouse 
gases. In addition to shifting their portfolios towards more climate-friendly investments, they 
are also seeking to achieve this goal through targeted engagements (PDC, 2015). Another 
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organizational platform provided by the United Nations, the Principles of Responsible 
Investment (PRI) initiative, supports institutional investors in making their investment 
decisions in line with CSR criteria and in functioning as active owners (PRI, 2019).  
In addition to these voluntary associations of institutional investors, norm-constrained 
owner groups such as pension funds, university endowments, and religious organizations are 
also associated with higher eco-social or ethical investment behavior (Hong and Kacperczyk, 
2009). The decisive question here is whether this seemingly eco-social awareness of investors 
is actually leading to changes at the source of externalities − in the corporations. 
Our first hypothesis is related to the investigation of Dyck et al. (2019), which first 
addresses this question and shows that institutional ownership share is positively related to 
future CSR performance. It further demonstrates that this effect intensifies when using 
exclusively the ownership shares of PRI signatories – a labeled owner group for which a higher 
eco-social awareness sounds plausible. Taking into account the above-mentioned points of 
criticism regarding the assumption of homogeneous institutional preferences, we refer to the 
individual eco-social preferences of the entire range of corporate owners and hypothesize:  
H1a: The higher the level of the ownership’s ESG preference is, the higher the CSR 
performance. 
H1b: An increase in the ownership’s ESG preference causes positive changes in future CSR 
performance. 
On the surface, these predictions sound trivial, but their empirical confirmations would 




The second hypothesis addresses the influence of owners’ heterogeneity directly. 
Dimson et al. (2015) show that collaborations among shareholders contribute positively to the 
success of CSR engagements. A basic prerequisite for entering into such alliances is that the 
shareholders’ preferences regarding the purpose of engagement are similar. On the other hand, 
heterogeneous or even conflicting shareholder interests lead to challenges for management and 
shareholder agreement on the appropriateness of an action (Goranova and Ryan, 2014). 
Therefore, we expect that:  
H2a: The higher the level of ownership’s heterogeneity regarding ESG preferences is, the lower 
the CSR performance.  
H2b: An increase in the ownership’s heterogeneity regarding ESG preferences causes negative 
changes in future CSR performance. 
Following the “doing well by doing good” hypothesis, the literature mentions specific 
owner characteristics that are linked to the promotion of CSR activities. In this context, Monks 
and Minow (1995) coined the term “universal ownership” to describe (institutional) investors 
with a wide range of equity holdings. Due to their slice of the broad economy, they are 
particularly affected by corporate externalities. The logical deduction is that it is in the universal 
owners’ self-interest to reduce negative and encourage positive externalities by influencing 
holding firms’ businesses. However, this derivation has never been empirically verified. With 
our third hypothesis we refer to the fundamental characteristic that defines the “universality” 
of an owner, i.e. the number of portfolio firms held. In this way, we avoid an exclusive 
consideration of specific investors or types of investors (for example, pension funds are often 
referred to as universal owners), but also include the entire ownership of a company. Based on 




H3a: The higher the ownership’s universality is, the higher the CSR performance. 
H3b: An increase in the ownership’s universality causes positive changes in future CSR 
performance. 
A second characteristic that Hawley and Williams (2001) attribute to universal owners 
is the long-term nature of their relationships with holding firms. Bãnabou and Tirole (2010) 
argue that investments in CSR activities are not immediately reflected in an increase in 
shareholder value, but are first and foremost costs. Accordingly, it can be expected that short-
sighted investors will be less interested in promoting CSR activities and more interested in 
reducing them in order to maximize short-term profits. In contrast, it can be concluded that 
long-term owners aim to promote CSR activities that contribute to a sustainable and 
intertemporal maximization of profits. In contrast to Nguyen et al. (2020), who find that long-
term investors increase the shareholder value of CSR activities, we investigate the direct 
connection between ownership investment horizon and CSR activities and assume that: 
H4a: The longer the ownership’s investment horizon is, the higher the CSR performance. 
H4b: An increase in the ownership’s investment horizon causes positive changes in future CSR 
performance. 
 Data and summary statistics 
5.3.1 Data sources and sample construction 
Our global dataset consists of three major databases: ownership information, firms’ financial 
characteristics, and firms’ ESG information. We obtain data regarding ownership information 
from the Refinitiv Ownership and Profiles (ROP) database6. Refinitiv’s ownership data covers 
the majority of publicly listed firms worldwide. Primary sources of this database include SEC 
 
6 Formerly known as Thomson Reuters Global Equity Ownership database. 
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filings, international declarable stakes notifications, mutual fund and ETF portfolios, share 
registers, and directors’ and insiders’ disclosures. The database provides information about the 
number of shares held and the respective market value of the owners’ positions in the individual 
firms. The data also enables us to identify the investor type of the individual owners (e.g., hedge 
funds). We calculate each investor's ownership share based on their number of shares held in 
relation to the respective firm’s common shares outstanding for each year-end. In addition to 
the ownership information, we use the reported value of the positions held by each investor to 
calculate holding weights and thereby create a panel of the owners’ global stock portfolios. It 
should be noted that the portfolios considered here do not reflect the single fund levels (e.g., 
iShares Core MSCI World) but the investment company levels (BlackRock Inc.).7 
Stock returns, common shares outstanding and market capitalizations are obtained from 
Refinitiv Datastream8 (RDS). To ensure that observed stocks are not exclusively owned by 
individual major investors, firms have to pass a minimum free-float requirement of at least 10% 
of the total market capitalization. We include firms that have been delisted or newly listed 
during the observation period to avoid survivorship bias. As already shown by Ince and Porter 
(2006) integrity of the RDS returns is not beyond doubt, which is why we adapt their proposed 
screens to daily returns.9  
To determine the firms’ CSR performance, we employ information from the ASSET4 
ESG database provided by Thomson Reuters. ASSET4 analysts collect firm-specific data on 
ESG dimensions from a variety of public sources to quantify the quality of a firm’s ESG 
policies. The data contains 70 environmental, 78 social, and 71 governance indicators. These 
 
7 Most (proxy) voting-rights policies incl. CSR strategy apply at company level and do not differ from fund to 
fund within an investment company. In the context of this investigation, the investment company level is therefore 
chosen as plausible owner level. 
8 Formerly known as Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
9 Ince and Porter (2006) originally developed screens for monthly returns. The adaptation to daily returns has the 
advantage that remaining outliers or approximations caused by these screens are less significant when converting 
to annual returns. 
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indicators are answers to YES/NO questions, double YES/NO questions and numerical 
questions with a positive or negative direction that reflect a firm’s commitment to CSR-relevant 
issues (e.g., “Does the company monitor the diversity and equal opportunities in its workforce?” 
as a YES/NO question with a positive direction within the “social” subcategory). When 
assessing the answers, we follow Dyck et al. (2019) and evaluate, for example, a “YES” to a 
question with a positive direction with a value of “1” and with “0” for “NO”.10 The sum of the 
evaluated indicator values (I) divided by the total number of indicators gives the “raw” ESG 
score or, by referring to the indicators of the respective subcategory, the raw E, S and G scores:  






× 100 (1) 
In Equation (1), 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 represents the corresponding raw E, S, G or ESG score 
of a firm 𝑖𝑖 in year 𝑖𝑖, 𝑁𝑁 is the number of indicators and 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 denotes the value of indicator 𝑙𝑙. The 
scores are calculated on an annual basis, which allows us to track changes in firms’ ESG 
activities over time. In contrast to the “ranked-based” scores directly provided by ASSET4 
ESG, these scores are not relative to other firms’ scores evaluated in the year under review. 
Firm-specific changes in CSR performance can thus be observed independently of changes in 
other firms’ scores.11 Since this data is available from 2002, it also defines the beginning of our 
investigation period.  
  
 
10 Details on the ESG-specific indicators and their translation into indicator values are available upon request. 
11 This avoids, for example, accusing a firm of slackening its CSR efforts when in fact these have remained constant 
and only the scores of other firms have improved. 
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5.3.2 Summary statistics 
Table 1 gives an impression of the extensive coverage of our sample in terms of market 
capitalization and ownership information. The aggregated market capitalization of the sample 
firms (RDS database) covers an annual average of 93.49% of the aggregated global common 
equity of all listed firms (according to The World Bank, 2018). On average, we observe 150,554 
owners holding around 64% of the sample market capitalization each year-end (ROP database). 
Accordingly, the remaining ownership shares are not covered by Refinitiv’s primary 
sources and can therefore predominantly be described as small or micro investors, which are 
neglected in this investigation12. We observe an increase in the coverage of ownership 
information over time, which can be explained by the growing market share of institutional 
investors (see OECD, 2017). To the best of our knowledge, we use a sample that is unsurpassed 
in terms of both aggregated market capitalization and the amount of ownership information 
covered. 
[Insert Table 1 here.] 
The geographical distribution of the sample firms includes 50 countries with economies 
at all stages of development, and without exclusion of any industry. Table 2 provides basic 
summary statistics for the full sample consisting of 28,201 firms on an annual basis between 
2002 and 2017. This large number of firms is needed to ensure the most complete possible 
replication of the owners’ global stock portfolios. Market value and return statistics refer to the 
full sample of 338,897 firm-years, respectively, whereas the ESG score and its subscores refer 
to 51,966 firm-years or 7,089 firms for which ASSET4 ESG information is available.  
 
12 Refinitiv’s ownership database sources most of its information from reports of declarable shareholdings (e.g., 
13d and 13f filings). Since the reporting obligation is in most cases only triggered at volume-related thresholds, 
the database mainly reflects large investors or investors with large ownership shares. 
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Panel A shows a mean (median) market capitalization of $2.352 ($352) million and a 
mean (median) stock return of 9.58% (3.40%) p.a. for the full sample. For the subsample of 
firm-years for which ESG information is available, the mean ESG score is 37.33. The means of 
the subscores are 20.28 for environmental, 41.34 for social and 49.75 for governance, 
respectively, with a perfect score being 100.  
[Insert Table 2 here.] 
We provide more detail on the covered ownership level and ESG scores across countries 
in Panel B and industries in Panel C. With about 25%, the majority of our sample firms are 
located in the US, and with an average of 73.93%, US firms also achieve one of the highest 
levels of coverage with regard to ownership data. The least amount of ownership information 
shown is for Pakistan with an average of 13.90%. Panel C shows the average ownership 
coverage per industry, ranging from 55.30% to 61.22% for the full sample and from 63.08% to 
73.62% for ASSET4 ESG firms. In total, the average ownership coverage of all firm-years is 
lower than for ASSET4 ESG firm-years (58.78% compared to 68.34%). 
 Measuring the Characteristics of Corporate Ownership 
5.4.1 Owner characteristics 
The first step in determining the ownership characteristics of a firm is to evaluate the 
characteristics of every single owner. To obtain a measurable assessment of the objectives 
pursued by the individual owners, we refer to their portfolio compositions and the resulting 
portfolio characteristics. In doing so, we assume that the characteristics of an investor are 
expressed by the characteristics and weighting of their individual holdings within the portfolio, 
and that these at the same time reflect the characteristics or preferences of their role as owner. 
This has the advantage that we do not depend on labels or generalized assumptions regarding 
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the characteristics of various investor or owner groups but can make an objective measurement 
at investor level. 
To quantify owner attitudes towards aspects of ESG, we calculate the sustainability 
scores of a portfolio following Gibson and Krueger (2018). For each year, the total ESG score 
and its subscores are aggregated at portfolio level by computing the value-weighted average of 
the ESG scores of the holdings as: 




where 𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the holding weight of firm 𝑖𝑖 in owner portfolio 𝑗𝑗 at each year-end 𝑖𝑖 and 
𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 describes either the raw E, S, G or ESG score of the corresponding investor.  
To determine each investor’s investment horizon, we follow Gaspar et al. (2005) and 
use the turnover ratio derived from portfolio holdings to build an approximation of the 
commitment period of an owner: 
𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 =
min��𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡�, �𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡��
0.5(𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 + 𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡−1)
  (3) 
In Equation (3), 𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 is the value of buy trades and 𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 is the value of sell 
trades since the end of the previous year, and 𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 is the held value of all equity holdings of 
the owner portfolio in the corresponding year. The higher the turnover ratio, the more frequently 
the owner trades portfolio positions, and the shorter the investment horizon and vice versa. As 
this definition reflects the turnover of a portfolio on a year-end basis, we necessarily neglect 




Universal owners are characterized by the fact that they represent a high share of the 
entire market in their portfolios (e.g., Hawley and Williams, 2007). To measure an owner’s 
“universality”, we count the number of firms in which an owner has invested at each year-end 
and thus follow the logic that the higher the number, the more universal the owner. 
Analogous to the calculation of the owners’ ESG scores in equation (2), we also use the 
value-weighted average of holding returns as a measure of owner portfolio returns.  




Unlike Equation (2), we use the holding weight at the beginning of each year 
(𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1) to avoid falsifications due to return-induced weight changes. These portfolio 
returns are calculated on a buy-and-hold assumption and trades during the year are therefore 
neglected. Only long equity positions are considered, as short, fixed-income, derivatives or cash 
positions are not available in the data. Also, expenses such as transaction costs or fees are not 
taken into account, which is why these returns are interpreted as hypothetical buy-and-hold 
portfolio raw returns. 
Table 3 shows the means and standard deviations of portfolio characteristics for each 
investor type. By comparing the means of portfolio ESG scores across investor types, it comes 
as no surprise that pension funds are the leaders among all owner types, with an average ESG 
score of 44.55. This is in line with expectations since pension funds are often bound to social 
norms, which include awareness for ESG aspects (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009). Hedge funds 
have the highest turnover (15.25%), which confirms the short-term orientation of this type of 
investor (Cella et al., 2013). In contrast, individual investors have the lowest turnover ratio of 
0.69% and can, therefore, be described as buy-and-hold investors. Since individual investors 
make up the majority of observations, they also have a significant influence on the equal-
 
63 
weighted overall means. For example, all investors combined show an average turnover ratio 
of only 3.03%. As noted above, the portfolios considered here reflect the investment company 
level at year-end. Both the high level of aggregation and the neglected intra-year trades have a 
negative effect on turnover ratios, as opposing trades of the individual funds of an investment 
company are netted out.  
[Insert Table 3 here.] 
A general attribution of certain characteristics based on investor types seems to be 
justified when only the means are considered, but for the standard deviations it becomes clear 
that there is considerable heterogeneity within the different types of investors. This 
heterogeneity among investors, regardless of the investor type, requires methodological 
development that can establish a relationship between the increasingly diverse and dynamic 
ownership structures and the CSR activities they encourage.  
5.4.2 Endogeneity adjustments 
The owner characteristics of a firm described in the previous section are used in our main 
analysis as explanatory variables for firm characteristics (ESG scores). Since the owner 
characteristics themselves were determined based on firm characteristics, we might be 
confronted with endogeneity. To ensure that only the effects of the owners on firm 
characteristics are considered, we eliminate the individual contribution of the respective firm 
to the calculated owner characteristics as: 
𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 = 𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 −





where 𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 is the raw E, S, G or ESG score of owner portfolio 𝑗𝑗 for each 
specific firm 𝑖𝑖 based on all other firms 𝑖𝑖 in the respective owner portfolio in year 𝑖𝑖. Consistently, 
the same adjustment for the owner portfolio return is executed using the weights of the previous 
 
64 
year 𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡−1. Following the same principle, we adjust investor turnover by neglecting the 
buy and sell values as well as the value held (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡) by the respective firm 𝑖𝑖: 
𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 =
min���𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 − 𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡��, �(𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 − 𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡)��
0.5((𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡− 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡) + (𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡−1− 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡−1))
 (6) 
Lastly, the number of portfolio holdings, as a measure of an owner's universality, is 
simply adjusted by subtracting 1. The owners’ characteristics adjusted in this way are individual 
for each firm-year. Therefore, the firm-level aggregate of corporate owners’ characteristics − 
referred to as ownership characteristics and described in the following section − is not 
influenced by the respective firm itself.13  
5.4.3 Ownership characteristics 
So far, the evaluation of the owners’ portfolio characteristics based on portfolio holdings has 
been the focus of attention. The second methodical step takes the perspective of an individual 
firm or its executives and provides a quantifiable answer to the overriding question in the 
context of corporate management: What is the owners’ preference regarding certain aspects of 
corporate policy? To aggregate the heterogeneous or even opposed preferences of a large 
number of different partial owners to one figure, we consider the individual firm technically as 
a “portfolio of owners”, which enables us to compute the ownership characteristic of a firm as 
follows: 




The particular adjusted characteristics (ESG scores, number of holdings, turnover, and 
return) of the owner portfolios 𝑗𝑗 are parameterized by 𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡. By 
 
13 Since the firm-level aggregate of corporate owners’ characteristics is carried out under consideration of owner 
preferences (portfolio weights) and ownership structure (ownership shares), the respective firm characteristic is 
not endogenously affected by other firms’ average characteristics (e.g., peer pressure) which avoids a reflection 
problem according to Manski (1993). 
 
65 
using the ownership share of the respective owner ( 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 ) as a weighting factor, we 
implicitly integrate the balance of power between the owners. At the same time, the amount of 
the ownership share determines the prospects of success of a forced change in future corporate 
policy orientation, for example within the context of a vote on a specially submitted shareholder 
proposal. Accordingly, the preferences of an owner with a high ownership share are given a 
correspondingly higher weighting and vice versa.  
As seen in Panel C of Table 2, we achieve an average ownership coverage of 68.35% 
for ASSET4 ESG firms and therefore neglect the remaining free float held by investors who 
are not subject to regulatory reporting requirements (e.g., SEC filings). As the associated 
reporting thresholds are triggered when the portfolio value or the ownership share is sufficiently 
high, these investors are essentially small. Due to their minor ownership shares, these small 
investors would in any case have only petty effects on our measure. The definition of 
𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖_ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 therefore simplifies by assuming full ownership coverage and corresponds to the 
ratio between the shares held by an owner 𝑗𝑗 and the total shares held by all owners that can be 
represented by our sample per firm and year.  
Within the ownership structure of a firm, different shareholders might have different 
preferences for CSR policies. This heterogeneity harbors potential conflicts among 
shareholders and leads to challenges for corporate management to align CSR activities in the 
common interest of the entire ownership. Nevertheless, a homogeneous set of interests among 
shareholders promises not only to improve management’s decision-making ability from the 
owners’ standpoint, but also to improve the possibility of collaboration among active 
shareholders. To quantify the heterogeneity of owners’ eco-social preferences, we use the 
standard deviation of the owners’ ESG scores within a firm: 
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𝑂𝑂𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 = � 
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𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠




Table 4 shows the summary statistics of the calculated ownership characteristics for 
firm-years with available ASSET4 ESG information. The average firm’s ownership possesses 
an ESG score of 34.78. Compared to the owners’ portfolio ESG scores with a mean of 39.34 
(Table 3), this indicates that owners holding larger ownership shares tend to have a less strong 
preference for ESG. The standard deviation of the owners’ ESG preferences within firm-years, 
referred to as Ownership ESG score Heterogeneity, is on average 7.45, while the overall 
standard deviation of ESG preferences at the portfolio level shows a standard deviation of 9.96 
(Table 3). This implies that owners have more similar ESG preferences within firms than across 
all owners. These relationships also apply to the respective subscores.  
Compared to the average number of holdings at the portfolio level of around 35 (Table 
3), the average number of holdings of the ownerships is relatively high at over 1,800. This is 
mainly due to the statistical effect of averaging on firm-year level, since owners with a high 
number of holdings also appear in a high number of firm-years. At 11.12%, the Ownership 
turnover is also higher than at the individual owner level (3.03%). In contrast, the return at the 
ownership level is lower than at the portfolio level (7.17% to 12.27%). This suggests that on 
average the dominate portion of a firm’s owners have shorter investment horizons and generate 
lower returns than the average figures at the individual owner level. 
[Insert Table 4 here.] 
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 Corporate Ownership Characteristics and Social Responsibility 
5.5.1 Is CSR related to the characteristics of ownership? 
With our first analysis we investigate the contemporary relation between ownership 
characteristics and firms’ CSR performance by conducting a panel regression at the firm-year 
level: 
𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑂𝑂𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑂𝑂𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛽𝛽3𝑂𝑂𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑂𝑂𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛽𝛽5𝑂𝑂𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 +  𝜂𝜂𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆𝜆 +  𝜏𝜏 +  𝜀𝜀𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 
(9) 
The dependent variable, denoted by 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡, is one of the environmental, social, 
governance, or the total ESG score of firm 𝑖𝑖 in year 𝑖𝑖. The ownership’s eco-social preference 
and its heterogeneity are denoted by 𝑂𝑂𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 and 𝑂𝑂𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 
according to the respective score of the dependent variable. 𝑂𝑂𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 is the 
ownership’s universality defined as the natural logarithm of the owners’ share-weighted 
number of holdings, and 𝑂𝑂𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡  proxies the ownership investment horizon. 
As a control variable at ownership level, we include 𝑂𝑂𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 computed as the 
corporate owners’ share-weighted equity portfolio return. Following Dyck et al. (2019) we use 
firm size as the natural logarithm of market capitalization, assets tangibility, yearly stock return, 
leverage, and Tobin’s Q as firm-level control variables (𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡). As seen in Table 2, 
variation exists in firms’ ESG scores across industries and countries. We conservatively control 
for these variations with firm (𝜆𝜆) and time-fixed effects (𝜏𝜏), and cluster standard errors at firm 
level. 
Table 5 shows the corresponding regression estimates. The first three columns show 
coefficient estimates for the subcategories of ESG, column 4 for the total ESG score. The 
coefficients on Ownership E, S, G or ESG score indicate a positive relationship between 
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ownership’s eco-social preferences and the level of the owned firm’s CSR, each significant at 
the 1% level. This confirms the hypothesis H1a that the owners’ eco-social awareness is 
positively related to CSR performance. As a consequence of the adjustments described in 
section 5.3.2, these coefficients are not endogenously driven by the firm itself.14 Rather, they 
are an indication that ownership with high eco-social awareness is not coincidentally linked to 
a firm with higher CSR performance but can be consistently attributed to the owners’ general 
investment preference. Accordingly, the CSR efforts of a company are not detached from the 
preferences of its owners. Also, the coefficients of the owners’ heterogeneity show consistent 
results. The negative signs meet expectations (H2a) that a firm that has a more disparate 
ownership structure in terms of eco-social preferences, on average shows significantly lower 
CSR performance. 
Further, the results confirm the positive influence attributed in particular to universal 
and long-term owners (H3a and H4a). Except for the environmental subcategory, the 
coefficients for the share-weighted number of firms held by the owners (Ownership holdings) 
show a positive and significant relationship with CSR. Also, the ownership investment horizon, 
which we approximate by the owners’ share-weighted portfolio turnover ratio  
(Ownership turnover), shows a significant relationship with CSR performance; the higher the 
owners’ turnover is − or the shorter their investment horizon is − the lower the firms’ CSR 
performance. The ownership return also shows a negative relationship with each of the firm’s 
ESG categories, indicating that financially more successful ownership is associated with lower 
CSR performance. Due to the lack of a theoretical foundation regarding this relationship so far, 
 
14 Without the adjustment described in section 5.3.2, an extreme constellation would be possible, in which a single 
owner owns a single firm in full. In this case, the explanatory and dependent variable (e.g., Ownership ESG score 
and firm’s ESG score) would be completely identical. This constellation and also milder variants of endogeneity 
are excluded by the adjustment. 
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we can only assume that financially more successful ownerships avoid the promotion of CSR 
and the associated costs. 
[Insert Table 5 here.] 
5.5.2 Do ownership characteristics drive firms’ CSR performance? 
So far, the results have shown a strong and significant relationship between ownership 
characteristics and the level of CSR. These findings, we argue, suggest that the CSR efforts of 
a firm are influenced by the corresponding preferences of its ownership. In this section, we 
further examine whether these ownership characteristics are drivers of CSR activities in line 
with the theoretical assumptions in Section 5.2.2. To test the derived hypotheses, we use a 
dynamic specification of the empirical model described in Equation (9) by adding the firm’s 
current CSR level as a predictor for the CSR level in the following year: 
Δ𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1Δ𝑂𝑂𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2Δ𝑂𝑂𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛽𝛽3Δ𝑂𝑂𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4Δ𝑂𝑂𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛽𝛽5Δ𝑂𝑂𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿Δ𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 (𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉)𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝜂𝜂Δ𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝜏𝜏 + 𝜀𝜀𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 
(10) 
To deal with concerns about autocorrelation resulting from dynamic panel estimation, 
we follow Anderson and Hsiao (1982) and specify Equation (10) in terms of first differences 
(Δ) and use Δ𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 as an instrument variable (IV) for Δ𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡. We control for 
firm-level characteristics (Δ𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡) as described in Section 5.5.1, and year fixed effects 
denoted by 𝜏𝜏, to control for firm-invariant changes in CSR scoring (e.g., changes in the ASSET4 
valuation methods). 
[Insert Table 6 here.] 
Table 6 reports the results on the influence of ownership characteristics on the firm ESG 
score as well as for the subscores in the subsequent year. Column 4 shows a positive coefficient 
on ownership ESG score, significant at the 1% level. Columns 1 to 3 confirm this positive 
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relation regarding each subcategory, significant at least at the 10% level. These results show 
the first empirical evidence that corporate executives are responding to their owners’ eco-social 
preferences or demands (H1b). Except for the social dimension, coefficients on ownership 
heterogeneity are significantly negative. This indicates that if firms are confronted by owners 
who are more disunited in their eco-social preferences, CSR performance will be lower (H2b). 
This accords with the expectation that conflicting shareholder interests lead to challenges for 
management and shareholder agreement on the appropriateness of an action (Goranova and 
Ryan, 2014) and confirms the corollary hypothesis that a unified voice among corporate owners 
in terms of eco-social preferences positively affects CSR efforts (Dimson et al., 2015).  
Also, hypothesis H3b regarding the inherent interest of universal ownership to reduce 
negative and encourage positive externalities by promoting CSR can be confirmed by the 
positive and significant relationship between the number of ownership holdings and future CSR 
performance in all specifications. Furthermore, hypothesis H4b is confirmed in that a positive 
change in long-term ownership is associated with increased future CSR performance, indicated 
by the negative coefficients on ownership turnover. Since coefficients on changes in ownership 
return are consistently negative, more financially successful owners seem to be a driving cause 
of reduced CSR activity. 
5.5.3 Reverse causality: Does CSR performance attract characteristic ownerships? 
A potential concern is that our findings on the relationship between ownership characteristics 
and future CSR performance are not driven by the influence of owners as set out in the 
hypotheses, but are merely a consequence of positive or negative screening based on CSR 
criteria in the owners’ investment decision process. Accordingly, the ESG score of the selected 
firms would predict the level of the ownerships’ eco-social awareness or other ownership 




To determine whether ownership characteristics govern a firm’s CSR performance, we 
follow Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and test Granger causality within a panel vector autoregressive 
(VAR) framework.15 Contrary to a related approach used by Dyck et al. (2019), we use first 
differences instead of firm fixed effects to control for endogeneity caused by the dynamic panel 
setup. However, our results remain unchanged when using firm fixed effects instead. 
Panel A of Table 7 reports the causal relationship between ownership ESG scores and 
the corresponding firm scores. The coefficient estimates of the first four columns correspond 
to the results in Table 6 and show a positive and significant impact of ownership on future CSR 
performance, whereas Columns 5 to 8 report that future ownership ESG scores do not depend 
on firms’ CSR performance. We therefore do not find evidence for the screening hypothesis or 
reverse causality regarding the relation between ownership ESG score and CSR performance.  
Panel B of Table 7 shows the causality checks for the remaining ownership 
characteristics. A significant influence of CSR performance on the future characteristics of 
owners (second column in each case) would mean that the CSR performance of a firm would 
“attract” a characteristic ownership. It would, therefore, be conceivable that firms that operate 
in a more sustainable manner would be particularly appealing to long-term oriented, universal 
or homogeneous owners. We also find no empirical support for this supposition. Instead, we 
find confirmation for our baseline results of ownership characteristics driving CSR 
performance. However, the low negative correlation between CSR performance and future 
ownership return suggests that firms with higher CSR commitment tend to “scare off” investors 
 
15 In particular, we estimate a symmetric pair of panel VAR models. The first is identical to the model defined in 
Equation (10), in which firms’ future CSR performance is considered to depend on ownership score. In the second 
regression the respective future ownership ESG score depends on CSR performance, the lagged ownership score 
as an instrument for ownership score and controls. These pairwise regressions are also performed for the remaining 
ownership characteristics.  
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with a stronger focus on returns. This would also be in line with the conjecture that CSR-
oriented investors may be prepared to forfeit financial performance for better ESG performance. 
[Insert Table 7 here.] 
5.5.4 Further robustness tests 
We perform several additional analyses to test the robustness of our results. In our main 
analysis, we capture unobserved and time-invariant firm characteristics that influence the 
variation in CSR activities by controlling for firm fixed effects. Several related investigations 
instead use fixed effects to capture unobserved heterogeneity in country or industry attributes 
(e.g., Dimson et al., 2015; Dyck et al., 2019; Chen et al., 2020). To establish comparability 
with these empirical settings, we introduce a country and industry fixed effects specification.16 
Compared to our main findings in Table 5, the coefficient estimates in these additional 
specifications are higher. This is in accordance with expectations, as the estimates are less 
dependent on the cross-sectional variation and more on the likely lower time-series variation 
within firms. However, this procedure might lead to omitted (firm-level) variable bias, since it 
cannot be assumed that firms are fully homogeneous either within industries or countries. 
Second, we review our findings using the ranked-based ESG scores provided by 
ASSET4 ESG. As described in Section 5.2.1, to avoid distorting the development of individual 
firm scores over time, for our investigation we use specially calculated raw ESG scores that are 
not related to all firm scores evaluated in the respective year. Since our analysis in Table 5 is a 
contemporary view, it should make no difference whether ranked or raw scores are used. 
Unreported results confirm this expectation for the main results. To address further concerns 
about the ESG data used, we repeat our analysis using ESG ratings from the alternative data 
 
16 For the sake of clarity, the result tables from this and the following robustness tests are available on request. 
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provider “Sustainalytics” and our main findings remain unchanged economically and 
statistically. 
Third, we argue that using the overall institutional ownership share as an explanatory 
variable for the estimation of CSR performance by previous studies is a rather superficial 
methodological approach since it is based on the blanket assumption of homogeneous owner 
interests or characteristics. By using the ownership characteristics presented here as explanatory 
variables, we offer a methodological improvement for the investigation of ownership influence 
on firm characteristics in general, and on CSR in specific. To demonstrate this, we include the 
overall institutional ownership share in our baseline model as a control. As expected, the 
influence of the institutional ownership share on CSR is insignificant and our outcomes for 
ownership characteristics remain unaffected in all specifications. 
 Conclusion 
Do investors have any influence on the activities of the firms they own? In times of growing 
social and ecological awareness, this question is at the heart of a debate on whether investors 
can stimulate CSR activities, for example by (threatening) the divestment of shares or by 
shareholder engagement. We contribute to this debate by providing a novel methodology to 
directly measure explicit ownership preferences with respect to ESG criteria and relating these 
to the CSR performance of the firms they own. This novel approach addresses several points of 
criticism of previous approaches, provides a new category of firm-level variables and thus 
opens up a multitude of possible investigations on the influence of ownership on corporations 
− not only with regard to ESG and CSR.  
Our analysis of a comprehensive sample of publicly traded firms from 2002 to 2017 
provides global evidence that ownership characteristics drive CSR performance. In particular, 
we find that stronger eco-social preferences, as shown by the owners’ investment habits, are 
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positively related to a firm’s efforts to improve its CSR performance. Irrespective of whether 
this results from an active influence of shareholders or from a proactive adjustment of the firm, 
it implies that corporate management is responding to the eco-social demands of its principals. 
However, if corporate management is confronted with owners who show a higher degree of 
heterogeneity regarding their eco-social preferences, this results in lower CSR performance. 
Further, we find first empirical evidence for the positive influence of universal as well as long-
term ownership on CSR performance in line with theoretical assumptions articulated in the 
relevant literature.  
We hope that this study inspires future work on better understanding the shareholders’ 
potential to drive corporate businesses, especially with regard to meeting their eco-social 
preferences. On the other hand, this study is also intended to make (prospective) shareholders 
aware of their participation rights and thus of their own social responsibility. Furthermore, an 
outstanding empirical task is to determine whether this kind of shareholder primacy has the 
potential to enhance financial benefits. Finally, we hope that the methodological contribution 
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Table 1 – Global market capitalization and ownership coverage 
 
 
 Global market 
capitalization 
Aggregated market 
capitalization Ownership Information 
Year Trillion $ Trillion $ 












2002 22.77 20.31 89.19% 67,747 14,114 11.38 56.06% 
2003 31.25 28.15 90.07% 74,230 14,911 16.13 57.30% 
2004 36.68 33.00 89.97% 98,323 15,416 19.13 57.98% 
2005 40.44 37.43 92.56% 121,917 16,890 22.43 59.93% 
2006 49.99 45.88 91.78% 138,722 17,525 27.97 60.96% 
2007 60.31 54.56 90.48% 156,399 18,493 35.65 65.34% 
2008 32.27 29.68 91.99% 161,801 18,520 19.13 64.45% 
2009 44.61 41.95 94.03% 166,615 18,737 27.52 65.61% 
2010 51.47 48.19 93.63% 168,601 19,123 31.63 65.63% 
2011 44.38 42.55 95.87% 173,552 19,269 28.11 66.06% 
2012 51.13 48.49 94.83% 168,348 19,351 32.11 66.22% 
2013 60.24 58.02 96.32% 168,506 19,516 39.27 67.67% 
2014 63.43 60.58 95.50% 173,049 19,946 41.80 69.00% 
2015 61.90 60.64 97.97% 182,984 20,334 41.73 68.82% 
2016 65.00 62.53 96.21% 192,561 20,529 43.30 69.23% 
2017 79.23 75.61 95.43% 195,506 20,497 52.82 69.86% 
Average 49.69 46.72 93.49% 150,554 18,323 30.63 64.38% 
        
        
This table shows summary statistics on the yearly coverage of global market capitalization and ownership 
information of our sample from 2002 to 2017. Global market capitalization is the worldwide market value of 
common equity according to Worldbank (2018). Aggregated market capitalization is the aggregated market value at 
each year-end out of our sample of 28,201 firms. We report ownership information regarding the number of owners 
observed, the number of firms held, the value held in $US (held value in trillion $), and as a proportion of aggregated 




Table 2 – Summary Statistics 
 
 
Panel A. Summary statistics (pooled) 
 
  Observations Mean 
Standard 
deviation p1 Median p99 
Market capitalization 338,897 2,352,406 10,940,484 640 351,980 37,168,513 
Return 333,863 9.58% 52.41% -95.47% 3.40% 192.84% 
ESG-score 51,966 37.33 10.79 15.98 36.07 61.87 
E-score 51,966 20.28 12.88 5.71 16.43 53.57 
S-score 51,966 41.34 12.97 17.95 39.74 71.15 
G-score 51,966 49.75 14.31 14.08 52.11 74.65 




Table 2 continued – Summary Statistics 
 
 
Panel B. Summary statistics by country 
 
 All firms  Asset4 ESG firms 
 Firms Ownership  Firms Ownership E score S score G score ESG score 
Argentina 33 34.80%  16 33.81% 13.53 32.17 22.58 23.10 
Australia 837 50.17%  478 47.27% 15.64 39.01 52.70 35.98 
Austria 74 64.51%  21 58.57% 21.45 41.63 42.16 35.35 
Bahrain 25 48.06%  7 56.39% 6.79 25.32 37.25 23.26 
Belgium 130 54.87%  35 54.45% 20.92 42.28 47.64 37.19 
Brazil 307 63.67%  102 67.59% 24.10 50.49 41.11 39.01 
Canada 1,423 45.60%  405 55.34% 17.44 38.92 60.84 39.16 
Chile 133 81.56%  41 81.50% 20.28 43.39 30.14 31.71 
China 3,383 53.72%  279 64.99% 15.78 36.18 41.05 31.24 
Czech Republic 15 73.00%  5 80.92% 21.19 45.63 45.51 37.78 
Denmark 127 46.64%  33 47.19% 22.56 43.82 45.30 37.51 
Egypt 77 53.08%  11 63.66% 10.84 36.10 28.17 25.45 
Finland 122 60.38%  29 53.27% 30.95 47.21 53.06 43.91 
France 520 64.28%  122 62.26% 30.76 52.19 52.49 45.44 
Germany 587 56.22%  127 59.37% 27.61 49.75 44.19 40.87 
Greece 155 41.46%  25 48.11% 18.71 41.13 33.61 31.52 
Hong Kong 1,224 62.66%  205 70.26% 15.59 38.92 46.68 33.98 
Hungary 19 55.62%  4 68.26% 30.62 58.26 56.07 48.72 
India 1,005 62.02%  103 77.27% 24.95 46.81 47.52 40.05 
Indonesia 254 59.83%  37 73.04% 20.61 47.23 41.19 36.76 
Ireland 61 63.50%  18 61.70% 18.18 40.41 54.19 37.77 
Israel 194 65.70%  18 49.60% 17.56 42.85 44.76 35.39 
Italy 298 64.78%  73 55.93% 23.91 48.23 45.89 39.70 
Japan 2,897 49.02%  461 46.28% 26.39 39.19 27.72 31.38 
Kuwait 131 49.76%  10 36.17% 11.17 33.48 33.76 26.44 
Malaysia 423 51.15%  55 80.40% 19.03 45.97 51.86 39.27 
Mexico 147 40.90%  47 48.44% 20.80 43.74 36.84 34.17 
Morocco 41 66.94%  3 80.54% 12.32 46.84 26.01 29.05 
Netherlands 152 50.24%  51 50.75% 25.68 48.93 55.66 43.68 
New Zealand 101 40.67%  59 44.04% 15.58 35.71 47.16 32.99 
Norway 244 62.43%  32 62.58% 21.73 44.53 48.40 38.50 
Oman 33 47.54%  10 61.84% 10.14 36.48 39.96 29.19 
Pakistan 86 13.19%  5 65.71% 10.57 32.95 28.73 24.43 
Papua New Guinea 3 71.77%  - - - - - - 
Philippines 127 52.29%  24 65.18% 18.90 44.38 48.25 37.49 
Portugal 43 77.74%  13 76.31% 26.22 50.03 47.33 41.54 
Qatar 43 31.57%  14 45.96% 7.68 31.14 29.66 23.16 
Russian Federation 205 61.03%  38 61.53% 20.96 43.90 43.77 36.53 
Singapore 435 61.93%  55 62.45% 16.10 38.56 47.19 34.18 
South Africa 314 56.72%  142 66.65% 22.11 52.33 58.63 44.71 
South Korea 1,065 50.38%  136 60.93% 27.16 47.13 30.75 35.43 
Spain 189 60.92%  66 59.42% 27.62 53.04 48.55 43.46 
Sweden 342 58.95%  74 59.35% 25.57 45.25 50.27 40.58 
Switzerland 269 49.39%  82 48.92% 23.00 44.25 49.49 39.16 
Taiwan 979 43.84%  146 50.49% 22.89 39.95 33.14 32.29 
Thailand 249 48.74%  30 54.84% 22.13 46.69 52.46 40.71 
Turkey 183 32.55%  30 71.58% 23.63 40.61 38.29 34.43 
United Kingdom 1,450 74.63%  469 79.64% 22.07 45.71 56.92 41.79 
United States 6,950 72.93%  2,843 87.20% 16.54 37.49 57.30 37.22 




Table 2 continued – Summary Statistics 
 
 
Panel C. Summary statistics by industry 
 
 All firms  Asset4 ESG firms 
 Firms Ownership  Firms Ownership E score S score G score ESG score 
Basic Materials 2,695 55.30%  674 63.08% 25.53 43.11 51.31 40.15 
Cyclical Consumer 
G&S 3,883 63.48%  971 73.62% 20.06 40.27 48.57 36.50 
Energy 1,580 58.66%  501 67.73% 20.76 41.32 54.23 38.93 
Financials 4,749 56.37%  1540 65.63% 13.94 39.35 49.32 34.46 
Healthcare 2,061 60.59%  637 73.54% 15.98 39.45 50.89 35.66 
Industrials 4,236 59.32%  1,059 67.83% 23.90 42.37 48.08 38.32 
n.a. 3,234 55.19%  141 68.63% 11.23 32.09 44.57 29.47 
Non-Cyclical 
Consumer G&S 1,653 61.22%  447 68.40% 21.20 43.67 49.41 38.35 
Technology 3,062 57.41%  669 72.53% 22.04 40.62 49.09 37.43 
Telecommunicatio
ns Services 388 60.58%  174 67.27% 18.08 46.12 50.27 38.50 
Utilities 660 58.92%  276 63.43% 29.60 46.40 51.66 42.74 
Total 28,201 58.78%  7,089 68.34% 20.28 41.34 49.75 37.33 
          
          
Panel A of this table shows summary statistics of market capitalization, returns as well as environmental, social, 
governance, and ESG scores. Return is the yearly stock return winsorized at the 1%-level, ESG scores are calculated 
as described in the text. Panel B shows the average percentage of covered ownership information (Ownership) by 
country for the full sample and the subsample of Asset4 ESG firms, ESG Scores, and its subscores are shown as 
averages. Panel C shows the same variables as in Panel B by industry. The data is obtained from the ASSET4 ESG, 




Table 3 – Portfolio characteristics by investor type 
 
 
 N E score S score G score ESG score Portfolio Value $Tsd. # Holdings Turnover Return 
   mean (standard deviation) 
Bank and Trust 6,962 27.78 47.43 54.62 43.48 1,446,999 164.83 10.15% 9.13% (9.82) (9.89) (14.11) (9.88) (6,622,538.75) (343.39) (11.20%) (25.72%) 
Corporation 78,495 21.64 40.81 40.73 34.66 830,038 5.12 1.40% 9.69% (12.79) (11.86) (15.02) (10.65) (4,481,494.02) (33.34) (4.68%) (39.22%) 
Endowment Fund 192 22.66 41.61 57.74 40.78 473,500 59.13 11.12% 9.10% (11.70) (10.23) (9.10) (9.46) (1,188,864.13) (165.32) (14.94%) (29.14%) 
Foundation 307 25.62 44.98 54.92 42.02 595,404 33.31 4.30% 11.06% (14.83) (12.63) (13.36) (12.61) (1,482,838.66) (109.95) (8.25%) (33.88%) 
Government/SWF 1,535 28.48 50.91 50.96 43.76 15,563,791 105.09 3.94% 10.07% (12.51) (13.19) (12.96) (11.10) (45,283,209.22) (684.15) (6.97%) (36.21%) 
Hedge Fund 29,558 22.35 43.38 57.11 41.11 4,414,011 250.15 15.25% 10.00% (8.88) (9.15) (8.80) (7.67) (35,601,596.42) (684.36) (13.87%) (30.15%) 
Holding Company 2,567 23.18 45.64 45.40 38.38 3,085,615 8.12 1.93% 12.18% (12.29) (13.24) (13.79) (11.16) (6,213,982.21) (46.42) (5.40%) (41.37%) 
Individual Investor 479,858 19.65 41.95 56.19 39.44 35,686 1.28 0.69% 13.06% (12.07) (12.05) (10.66) (9.81) (608,878.72) (0.80) (3.88%) (41.20%) 
Insurance Company 2,088 25.31 45.49 49.33 40.29 3,223,739 109.65 7.51% 10.08% (11.24) (10.69) (14.09) (10.08) (11,040,276.48) (365.51) (8.77%) (28.07%) 
Investment Advisor (incl. Mutual Funds) 60,914 25.58 46.32 56.72 43.06 2,283,112 188.60 13.12% 10.15% (9.49) (9.38) (10.64) (8.67) (23,523,133.44) (462.45) (11.81%) (26.50%) 
Others 5,338 21.67 42.88 51.07 38.76 2,571,006 155.97 5.54% 13.00% (11.12) (11.73) (12.77) (10.03) (9,527,110.66) (522.59) (11.86%) (39.77%) 
Pension Fund 2,696 26.74 48.96 57.26 44.55 6,222,584 396.16 9.06% 10.11% (9.19) (9.39) (10.25) (8.42) (19,681,654.78) (913.82) (9.61%) (29.22%) 
Private Equity 1,504 16.28 37.64 51.95 35.45 776,684 9.73 7.34% 11.48% (10.91) (11.31) (9.85) (8.95) (1,578,389.12) (18.36) (11.79%) (42.95%) 
Venture Capital 727 14.68 35.23 50.88 33.74 431,783 14.57 8.51% 9.59% (9.94) (12.01) (9.18) (8.75) (827,773.82) (43.46) (12.09%) (43.96%) 
All 672,741 20.71 42.40 54.33 39.34 643,179 34.79 3.03% 12.27% (11.95) (11.78) (12.35) (9.96) (10,871,010.30) (232.90) (8.01%) (10.63%) 
 
 
This table shows summary statistics of owner characteristics categorized by the Refinitiv’s predefined typology. Owner characteristics are calculated as described in the text 





Table 4 – Ownership Characteristics 
 
 
  Mean Median Standard  deviation p1 p99 
Ownership E score 21.69 23.86 9.51 1.11 40.39 
Ownership S score 37.81 42.66 14.46 2.14 60.17 
Ownership G score 44.37 49.48 18.00 2.42 65.98 
Ownership ESG score 34.78 39.04 13.53 1.91 52.32 
Ownership E score 
Heterogeneity 6.20 5.52 3.04 1.41 13.54 
Ownership S score 
Heterogeneity 8.27 5.86 5.75 1.51 21.05 
Ownership G score 
Heterogeneity 9.47 7.36 6.80 1.64 23.89 
Ownership ESG score 
Heterogeneity 7.45 5.35 5.23 1.18 18.97 
Ownership # of Holdings 1,805.22 1,523.62 1,328.48 35.66 5,291.27 
Ownership Turnover 11.12% 11.84% 5.76% 0.46% 24.10% 
Ownership Return 7.17% 7.17% 17.60% -43.29% 55.74% 
      
      
This table shows summary statistics on ownership characteristics and heterogeneity of 42,237 firm-years. Variables 





Table 5 – Ownership Characteristics and their relation to CSR 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Firm E score Firm S score Firm G score ESG score 
      
Ownership E score 0.106***    
 (0.014)    
Ownership S score  0.028***   
  (0.008)   
Ownership G score   0.062***  
   (0.008)  
Ownership ESG score    0.044*** 
    (0.008) 
Ownership E score 
Heterogeneity 
-0.388***    
(0.059)    
Ownership S score 
Heterogeneity 
 -0.076   
 (0.055)   
Ownership G score 
Heterogeneity 
  -0.466***  
  (0.045)  
Ownership ESG score 
Heterogeneity 
   -0.554*** 
   (0.051) 
Ownership Holdings -0.118 0.290*** 0.697*** 0.250*** 
 (0.096) (0.096) (0.110) (0.081) 
Ownership Turnover -5.969*** -1.802 -8.734*** -4.197*** 
 (1.416) (1.363) (1.405) (1.111) 
Ownership Return -0.488** -0.980*** -1.291*** -0.888*** 
 (0.208) (0.197) (0.220) (0.165) 
Tobin's Q 0.135* 0.035 -0.040 0.051 
 (0.069) (0.059) (0.063) (0.050) 
Return -0.426*** -0.606*** -0.630*** -0.533*** 
 (0.082) (0.076) (0.083) (0.063) 
Size 0.540*** 0.783*** 0.489*** 0.613*** 
 (0.117) (0.106) (0.116) (0.091) 
Assets Tangibility -0.541 0.095 0.025 -0.234 
 (0.427) (0.416) (0.406) (0.334) 
Leverage 0.003 0.036 -0.013 0.010 
 (0.046) (0.043) (0.041) (0.036) 
Constant 10.440*** 22.250*** 35.193*** 23.970*** 
 (2.546) (2.336) (2.519) (1.966) 
     
Observations 42,237 42,237 42,237 42,237 
Within R-squared 0.015 0.013 0.029 0.029 
Adjusted R-squared 0.893 0.901 0.911 0.910 
     
     
This table reports regression estimates of ESG scores on ownership characteristics and control variables with time 
and firm fixed effects. The sample consists of 42,237 firm-years (excluding incomplete and singleton observations). 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by 





Table 6 – Ownership Characteristics as a driver of CSR performance 
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Lead Firm E Score Lead Firm S score Lead Firm G score Lead Firm ESG Score 
      
Ownership E score 0.019**    
 (0.009)    
Ownership S score  0.009*   
  (0.005)   
Ownership G score   0.012**  
   (0.005)  
Ownership ESG score    0.016*** 
    (0.004) 
Ownership E score 
Heterogeneity 
-0.174***    
(0.034)    
Ownership S score 
Heterogeneity 
 0.011   
 (0.034)   
Ownership G score 
Heterogeneity 
  -0.099***  
  (0.031)  
Ownership ESG score 
Heterogeneity 
   -0.212*** 
   (0.033) 
Ownership Holdings 0.136** 0.274*** 0.208** 0.245*** 
 (0.061) (0.065) (0.093) (0.052) 
Ownership Turnover -1.364* -0.899 -1.882** -1.506*** 
 (0.724) (0.826) (0.915) (0.556) 
Ownership Return -0.212 -0.301* 0.013 -0.248** 
 (0.142) (0.154) (0.173) (0.107) 
Firm E score  -0.144*    
 (0.075)    
Firm S score   -0.036   
  (0.041)   
Firm G score    0.027  
   (0.035)  
Firm ESG score    -0.383*** 
    (0.061) 
Tobin's Q -0.003 0.087** 0.007 0.035 
 (0.039) (0.044) (0.044) (0.034) 
Return -0.113** -0.047 -0.219*** -0.211*** 
 (0.057) (0.061) (0.063) (0.047) 
Size 0.273*** 0.260*** 0.359*** 0.408*** 
 (0.070) (0.076) (0.078) (0.064) 
Assets Tangibility -0.163 0.646*** 0.242 0.109 
 (0.215) (0.239) (0.265) (0.176) 
Leverage -0.001 0.019 -0.024 -0.006 
 (0.021) (0.028) (0.031) (0.020) 
Constant 1.307*** 1.172*** 0.906*** 1.642*** 
 (0.107) (0.070) (0.059) (0.096) 
     
Observations 30,451 30,451 30,451 30,451 
R-squared 0.108 0.013 0.132 0.296 
     
     
This table reports regression estimates of first differenced ESG scores on first differenced ownership characteristics, 
control variables and time fixed effects following Anderson and Hsiao (1981). The sample consists of 30,451 firm-
years (excluding incomplete and singleton observations). Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are 





Table 7 – Granger causality Tests 
 
 
Panel A. Ownership ESG-scores and firm ESG-scores 
 

















 E score 
Lead 
Ownership 
 S score 
Lead 
Ownership 





         
         
Ownership E score 0.019**    0.511***    
 (0.009)    (0.131)    
Ownership S score  0.009*    0.509***   
  (0.005)    (0.131)   
Ownership G score   0.012**    0.493***  
   (0.005)    (0.137)  
Ownership ESG score    0.016***    0.505*** 
    (0.004)    (0.136) 
Firm E score -0.144*    -0.010    
 (0.075)    (0.007)    
Firm S score  -0.036    -0.003   
  (0.041)    (0.011)   
Firm G score   0.027    -0.007  
   (0.035)    (0.011)  
Firm ESG score    -0.383***    -0.008 
    (0.061)    (0.014) 
         
Ownership Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Observations 30,451 30,451 30,451 30,451 30,451 30,451 30,451 30,451 




Table 7 continued – Granger causality Tests 
 
 
Panel B. Ownership characteristics and firm ESG score 
 























         
Ownership 
ESG score 
0.015*** -0.005*** 0.015*** 0.002 0.016*** -0.000*** 0.016*** -0.000 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) 
Ownership 
Heterogeneity 
-0.210*** 0.424*** -0.207*** -0.020 -0.210*** -0.000 -0.213*** 0.004 
(0.032) (0.119) (0.032) (0.020) (0.032) (0.000) (0.033) (0.003) 
Ownership 
Holdings 
0.267*** 0.050 0.243*** -0.120 0.239*** -0.004*** 0.247*** -0.015*** 
(0.057) (0.033) (0.055) (0.367) (0.054) (0.001) (0.056) (0.005) 
Ownership 
Turnover 
-1.527** 0.453** -1.511** 0.280 -1.504** 0.153*** -1.582*** 0.248*** 
(0.594) (0.186) (0.593) (0.673) (0.593) (0.034) (0.598) (0.058) 
Ownership 
Return 
-0.249** -0.087*** -0.247** -0.038 -0.246** -0.000 -0.244** 0.081*** 
(0.109) (0.031) (0.109) (0.027) (0.109) (0.002) (0.109) (0.023) 
Firm ESG 
score 
-0.381*** 0.003 -0.382*** 0.000 -0.382*** 0.000 -0.369*** -0.001** 
(0.061) (0.002) (0.061) (0.001) (0.061) (0.000) (0.061) (0.000) 
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 30,442 30,442 30,468 30,468 30,468 30,468 29,951 29,951 
R-squared 0.317 0.119 0.317 0.081 0.317 0.143 0.324 0.630 
         
         
This table reports the results of Granger causality tests on the influence of ownership characteristics on CSR. In Columns 
(1) through (4) of Panel A, the dependent variables are the firms’ future environmental, social, governance and ESG 
performance. In Columns (5) through (8), the dependent variables are the respective future ownership scores. Panel B 
reports the results of the same test pairwise for each of the remaining ownership characteristics. All tests are carried out 
as panel VAR including all ownership and firm controls as well as year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported 




6 Article V: Herds on green meadows: the decarbonization of institutional portfolios 
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We analyze an emerging sustainable trend in asset management: the decarbonization of 
institutional portfolios. By using broad institutional ownership data we show that investors 
exhibit herding behavior in the sense of decarbonization. They are inclined to follow their own 
or other investors’ buys in green stocks and sales in brown stocks over adjacent quarters. 
Beyond that, we find that Hedge Funds as well as Investment Advisors lead the herd by 
executing trades in the sense of decarbonization. This is in line with expectations that 
sophisticated investors, who integrate environmental aspects into their investment decision 
process, are able to attract imitators. For the aspired achievement of market-wide 
decarbonization, investors leading the herd should be encouraged to further decarbonize their 
portfolios in order to trigger follow-up trades. 
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7 Conclusion  
This dissertation aims to improve the general understanding of the various types of risk found 
in the portfolio of institutional investors. 
The first article sheds light on the risk to which extend US domestic equity funds are 
exposed to various financial securities and shows the effects of the combined use of linear and 
non-linear instruments on the risk, performance, and other characteristics of funds. It is shown 
that the average exposure in relation to the TNA of the funds resulting from the individual 
complex derivatives is almost negligible even in the extremes and does not exceed 2% of the 
net assets even when aggregated. Consequentially, the effects of these investments on funds’ 
risks, performance and other characteristics are minor. The results presented in this article 
contribute, inter alia, to the literature on the influence of complex risk caused by using 
derivatives. The methodical approach of a simultaneous consideration of the exact non-linear 
and linear exposure of the funds is the great advantage of this study. Previous analyses regarding 
the use of derivatives by funds have usually used only crude indicator variables, resulting in the 
loss of crucial information and potentially distorting results. By taking the exact composition 
of the portfolio into account, a more precise determination of the influences on the fund 
characteristics is possible. The findings of this study sustainably increase the understanding 
concerning the influence of non-linear risk exposure driven by complex derivatives on mutual 
funds and demonstrate the importance of the exact consideration of the funds' portfolio 
composition rather than the sole use of a particular financial instrument.  
Article II deals with the issue of interim trading risk arising from unobservable trading 
activities by fund managers between two consecutive holdings reports. Using an extension of 
the method of Kacperczyk et al. (2008), the impact of these unobservable trading activities is 
measured by comparing the actual risk the funds are exposed to with the approximated risk that 
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reflects the risk expected from the reported holding positions. The results of this study illustrate 
the relevance of the correct consideration of the interim trading behavior of fund managers 
when examining the funds’ performance and risk based on published holdings. It is shown that 
an excessive interim trading, measured by the intermediate deviation of the actual risk 
compared to the risk expected from the reported holdings, comes with an increase in the risk-
adjusted performance. However, this trading behavior of the fund managers has a negative 
impact on the gross return of the funds, which is not favorable from the investors' point of view. 
Therefore, future research should take the trades executed in between two reportings into 
account to a greater extent as they have a significant influence on funds’ performance and risk 
measures. 
The third article deals with another type of risk faced by institutional investors, which 
is one of the risks resulting from the worldwide transition process of the economy, the so-called 
carbon risk. To this end, the exposure to and management of these carbon risks of different 
groups of institutional investors are examined from 2000 to 2015. Thereby, it is shown that 
governmental agencies hold the highest proportion of carbon-intensive stocks in their portfolio, 
with 49% of their assets under management being identified as heavy polluting. In addition, the 
governmental agencies hold the highest percentage of the outstanding shares of the carbon-
intensive companies held. If the entire universe of all carbon-intensive stocks is considered, and 
not just those held by investors, a different picture emerges. The results reveal that hedge funds 
and investment advisors have the largest share of ownership in all of these companies and are 
therefore identified as the main financiers and at the same time the beneficiaries of the polluting 
companies. The results of this study provide, inter alia, policy makers with information on 
potential addressees of regulation, namely hedge funds and investment advisors. These groups 
will have an important role to play in ensuring that financial flows are consistent with the 
transition to a low-carbon economy as defined by the Paris Convention (UNFCCC, 2015). In 
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addition, this study is intended to stimulate future research to further investigate the influence 
of the ownership structure of carbon-intensive companies on the level of the companies’ 
emissions and their carbon risk management. 
The influence of shareholder engagement, already briefly mentioned in Article III, is 
further examined in Article IV. The study examines whether the preference of the owners 
regarding specific firm characteristics has an influence the respective company. This study 
shows that there is a positive correlation between the eco-social preference of the owners and 
the CSR performance of the company. This implies that the management reacts to the eco-
social demands of the owners, whereby no distinction is made between an active influence or a 
proactive adjustment by the company. According to the study, CSR performance is negatively 
affected if the company is associated with a higher heterogeneity of investors' eco-social 
preferences. This suggests that differences in investor preferences could therefore complicate 
the engagement process or even have negative effects. The results of this study reinforce the 
idea of shareholder engagement as a driver of change towards a greener economy. The study is 
intended to inspire new research to better understand the process of shareholder engagement 
and its importance and impact in relation to the transition process caused by climate change. 
Furthermore, the methodology to measure owner preferences and their impact on the key 
business indicators proposed in this study can be universally applied in future work and is not 
limited to the analysis of CSR performance, which should be exploited by future research. 
The PDC's goal of mobilizing a critical mass that reallocates its portfolio in the sense of 
decarbonization (PDC, 2015) is examined more closely in the final article of this dissertation. 
First, using traditional herding measures (following Sias (2004)), it is shown that there are 
groups of investors who, through their trades, trigger a large number of follow-up trades in the 
next quarter. Subsequently, this finding is combined with a classification of the firms with 
respect to their ESG score. By doing this, it is shown that investors are more likely to follow 
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the trades of other investors in the next quarter if these are carried out in the sense of 
decarbonization, i.e. the purchase of green companies as well as the sale of brown companies 
trigger more follow-up actions than trades in the sense of carbonization. The main objective of 
the PDC is supported by this study and it is even shown which group of institutional investors 
is the one leading the herd. In specific, the trades of investment advisors and hedge funds are 
followed most often, and these types of investors are best suited to mobilize the desired critical 
mass to achieve the long-term goal of decarbonization. This study focused mainly on an as-is 
description of the phenomenon of herding regarding the trend of decarbonization. Further 
investigations on the underlying causes of the decarbonization herding and its influence on the 
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